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1 General Introduction 
1.1 Delusions: Definitions and Introduction 
Delusions are a hallmark clinical manifestation of psychosis and play an important role in the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia. Apart from schizophrenia, delusions occur in a wide variety of 
medical and psychiatric conditions, including Alzheimer’s disease, Huntington’s disease, 
epilepsy, vascular dementia, traumatic brain injuries and intoxication from a wide range of 
substances (Maher & Ross, 1984).  
Despite its diagnostic significance for schizophrenia and other conditions associated with 
psychosis, delusions still lack a consistent common definition. A considerable number of authors 
have written about delusions without attempting to define it (e.g. Jaspers, 1913; Schneider, 1955; 
Arthur, 1964). 
Historically, non-specific definitions have associated delusions with madness, absurdity, 
groundlessness, error and chaos. Modern psychiatric definitions are based on the work of the 
German phenomenologists Emil Kraepelin (1899), Eugen Bleuler (1911) and Karl Theodor 
Jaspers (1913). 
In his essay “Delusion and awareness of reality”, Jaspers (1968) linked the definition of 
delusions to four main characteristics: (1) subjective certainty, (2) incorrigibility, (3) 
impossibility or falsity of content, (4) underlying delusional judgments are a transformed 
experience of reality (implausible, bizarre or patently untrue). 
Jasper’s criteria persisted in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000). However, some of the criteria are not as strongly stated in the current 
definition of delusions: 
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”A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly 
sustained despite what almost everybody else believes and despite what constitutes 
incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence of the contrary. The belief is not one 
ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g. it is 
not an article of religious faith).“ 
Despite its wide acceptance among clinicians and researchers, the current definition of delusions 
remains problematic and is a source of some controversy. For example, it is debatable whether 
delusions are indeed false beliefs. Proving that delusional content is faulty might be impossible 
(e. g. if the necessary evidence is not available). Also, extreme validity judgments of real events 
and facts may lead to opinions that are deemed delusional by others (e.g. grandiose delusions). 
The observation of deluded patients has indicated that a patient’s conviction in the veracity of 
their delusion can vary even over the course of a day and they are not always firmly sustained 
(Myin-Germeys et al., 2001). Furthermore, many patients with delusions accept that other people 
don’t believe in their ideas (Garety et al., 2005). Conversely, even scientists persist in their fixed 
beliefs in the face of overwhelming contradictory evidence and are not diagnosed for a mental 
illness (Kuhn et al., 1962). 
1.2 Phenomenology 
1.2.1 Classification 
Historically, delusions were classified by their hypothesized etiologies (Jaspers, 1913; Dupre & 
Logre, 1911). However, the current consideration of delusions focuses on their phenomenology. 
Consequently, delusions are most commonly classified by their content (Bleuler, 1911; Maher, 
1988). In general, a delusional belief can have any theme, though some delusional themes are 
more common than others. Table 1 displays a selection of the most common themes. 
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Persecutory delusions “My food is being poisoned by the police.” 
Grandiose delusions “I have the power to heal all the illnesses.” 
Delusional jealousy “My partner is cheating on me.” 
Erotomania “A famous pop star secretly signals her love 
to me over the radio.” 
Somatic “I am infected by tiny parasites.” 
Bizarre “My mother’s thoughts are being carried on 
raindrops that fall on the air conditioner.” 
Guilt “I am responsible for the AIDS epidemic.” 
Table 1: Presentation of the most common delusional themes and examples (Bell et al., 2006) 
1.2.2 Stability over Time 
Karl Theodor Jaspers emphasized that delusions ‘are held with absolute conviction, with 
incomparable, subjective certainty’ and that ‘there is an imperviousness to other experiences and 
to compelling counter-argument’ (Jaspers, 1969). Similarly, the current DSM-IV-TR definition 
presents delusions as a stable phenomenon (‘fixed, false belief’, APA, 2000). In earlier studies, 
there is some evidence that delusions are fixed and stable over time. Self-reinforcing 
mechanisms of delusional ideation have also been found (e.g., Brockington, 1991). However, 
there is growing evidence that there is considerable plasticity in most delusions (Appelbaum et 
al., 2004). Not only do delusions frequently change in content, delusion scores also proved to be 
fluid. One third of the subjects who displayed delusional symptoms at any given interview no 
longer showed delusional symptoms in follow-up assessments.  
1.3 Delusion Theories 
1.3.1 Traditional Theories of Delusions 
There have been numerous attempts to explain the phenomenon of delusions. At the beginning of 
the 20th century, Jaspers introduced the phenomenological method to psychiatry. In Germany, 
phenomenological research dominated until the end of the 1970s, when more biologically 
oriented concepts of psychosis and delusions became popular. 
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Early in the 20th century, Alfred Adler (1914/1925) hypothesized that (paranoid) delusions 
represent an attempt to escape reality and to blame others for one’s own failures in order to 
protect the ego. Jaspers named delusions “one of the biggest mysteries” (Jaspers, 1913) and 
stated that delusions “are a basic phenomenon of madness”. Distinguishing between primary and 
secondary delusions, he argued that secondary delusions arise from a person’s personal 
background, current situation or mental state. In contrast, he considered primary delusions as 
ultimately ‘un-understandable’, believing that there was no coherent reasoning process behind 
their formation (Jaspers, 1913). Kurt Schneider (1955), another influential German psychiatrist, 
put forward the theory that delusions emerge from a two-step process of perception and 
interpretation which is not logically understandable and only explicable by altered brain 
function, whereby the somatic underpinnings would not be identifiable. Gerd Huber (1982) 
hypothesized that delusions emerge from basically altered cognitive functions on the basis of 
biological pathology. 
In addition to these deficit-oriented theories, Sigmund Freud’s (1856 – 1939) psychodynamic 
perspective (Freud, 1911) suggested that delusions stemmed from a defective defense 
mechanism against unresolved homosexual impulses.  
Maher (1984) related delusions back to disturbances in perception. In his model, a basic 
biological perceptional abnormality results in vivid and intense sensory input. However, 
subsequent research provided evidence for impaired information processing and not perceptual 
disturbances in delusions. Despite its limited significance today, Maher’s attempt to find a 
cognitive explanation for delusional thinking was an impulse for further cognitive research on 
delusions. 
1.3.2 Multifactorial Cognitive-Neuropsychiatric Models of Delusions 
Over the last decade, notwithstanding issues of definition, delusions research has moved more 
and more towards cognitive neuroscience. “Cognitive Neuropsychiatry” (David, 1993) is a 
research branch that attempts to explain psychiatric phenomena with the methods of cognitive 
neuropsychology.  In the field of delusions, the challenge is to develop psychopathological 
theories that describe alterations in the normal psychology of belief formation and maintenance. 
Today, the multifactorial model of Garety and co-workers (2001) is widely accepted. It is built 
on the work of other researchers (Maher, 1988; Hemsley, 1993; Bentall et al., 1994; Chadwick et 
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al., 1994) and a large body of literature that investigated delusions within the framework of 
Bayesian models (Hemsley & Garety, 1986). The multifactorial model represents the integration 
of several cognitive deviations that were observed in experimental studies. Regarding 
attributional style, deluded patients were found to blame others rather than circumstances and 
take credit for themselves when personal outcome is favorable (Bentall et al., 1991). This ‘self 
serving bias’ applies particularly to paranoid delusions. Additionally, the putative role of 
delusions to enhance self-esteem and to provide protection to the ego has been postulated 
(Bentall et al., 2001). Recently, it was demonstrated that acutely deluded patients displayed 
higher explicit, but lower implicit self-esteem than remitted patients (Moritz et al., 2006a). 
Moreover, inabilities to empathize, labeled theory of mind deficits, have been linked to psychosis 
(Frith & Corcoran, 1996). Defective interpretation of other people’s intentions and facial 
expressions may produce problems in social inference and may lead to misinterpretations in 
social contexts. 
If a person in a situation of distress with threatening or negative events tends to blame others 
instead of circumstances, incorrect hypotheses about these events may evolve. For example, 
eating strange-tasting food, a person might come to the interpretation that somebody has 
poisoned it. Consequently, such misattributions may lead to the formation of (paranoid) 
delusional ideas. The probability of such misattributions may be supported by the tendency to 
jump to conclusions or the liberal acceptance of recently formed hypotheses and the reduced 
ability to understand other people’s perspectives and intentions due to theory of mind deficits. In 
addition to premature termination of data gathering before reaching a conclusion, the external 
attributions of negative events may protect the ego and lead to the maintenance of faulty 
hypotheses (Figure 1). 
In the following experiments, deviations in probabilistic reasoning are considered. Reasoning 
abnormalities have been studied in the frame of Bayesian models, which have previously been 
applied to normal reasoning models (Fischoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983). From a neuropsychiatric 
perspective, deviations from the theoretical model were studied in order to determine 
psychopathological mechanisms in delusions. The following paragraph will describe Bayesian 
Models and their implications to reasoning processes in more detail. This will be followed by a 
summary of reasoning abnormalities in delusions that have been studied using Bayesian 
methodologies, starting with the first experiment by Huq, Garety & Hemsley (1988).  
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Figure 1: Summary of the multifactorial model of (persecutory) delusions (Freeman, 2007) 
1.4 Bayesian Models 
‘Bayesian statistics’ refer to methods in probability and statistics named after the Reverend 
Thomas Bayes (ca. 1702–1761). With respect to belief formation and maintenance, Bayesian 
models might provide us with a framework for evaluating hypotheses or beliefs by the 
comparison between the cognitive model and the actual behavior of a test person (Fischhoff & 
Bayth-Marom, 1983). This approach takes into account both prior beliefs or hypotheses and 
current new information for inferential processes. Hypothesis evaluation might deviate from the 
optimal model in several ways, resulting from different types of irregularities in several 
categorical judgmental processes. Investigation into whether a particular judgmental process is 
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consistently being altered in a certain population (e. g. delusional individuals with schizophrenia) 
might be a promising approach to the nature of delusions (Garety et al., 1991). 
1.5 Probabilistic Reasoning in Delusions: An Overview Over 
the Findings 
Although reasoning irregularities and possible flaws in probabilistic reasoning frequently occur 
in normal populations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979; Kahneman, 2003), very few people develop 
delusions. Delusional thinking has been investigated by comparing deluded patients to healthy 
controls, employing a Bayesian model of probabilistic reasoning. Expectations were to be able to 
demonstrate distinct reasoning abnormalities in delusional and delusion-prone individuals. In the 
Bayesian model, these investigations address processes where the integration of new information 
is comprised. Although using paradigms in the 'framework of Bayesian models' (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999), observed reasoning deviations were not usually linked to a specific process of 
the theoretical model of Fischhoff & Bayth-Marom (1983). Designing paradigms that relate to 
specific aspects of this mathematical model may describe reasoning deviations more precisely. 
1.5.1 The Basic Paradigm 
In order to investigate probability judgments in delusions, the ‘beads task’ (Huq et al., 1988) has 
been employed, using several variations on the original paradigm. The study of Huq et al. (1988) 
can be regarded as the seminal study of reasoning abnormalities in delusions. In this experiment, 
two jars of beads were presented, one containing significantly more pink beads than green beads 
(ratio 85:15) and the other with the reverse relationship. From a single hidden jar, beads were 
taken, one by one, and participants were asked to guess whether the experimenter was taking the 
beads from the one or the other jar. Patients required less draws before they were ready to make 
their decision and displayed a higher initial certainty level (conviction), making decisions 
frequently after the very first bead was drawn. This finding, encapsulated in the phrase ‘jumping 
to conclusions’, has been replicated in numerous variations of the basic paradigm, suggesting a 
JTC bias for delusional and delusion-prone individuals (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Fine et. al., 
2007). 
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Figure 2: Two jars with different ratios of beads (Huq et al., 1988) 
1.5.2 The 20 Questions-Task 
In a similar study, probabilistic judgments and pre-decision data gathering were studied with the 
Twenty Questions game paradigm. The game usually involves one player raising a question, for 
example "What am I thinking of?", and the second player, the questioner, can then ask the first 
player questions, with the aim of finding the answer. Participants were the questioners, asking 
questions to narrow down the possibilities of what they were supposed to guess. Patients with 
schizophrenia were found to ask significantly fewer questions, and made their guesses more 
readily and with a higher certainty (John & Dodgson, 1994). 
These findings have been replicated frequently, most recently by Moritz et al., (2006b), who 
describe reasoning as incautious, leading to premature decision-making. Probability estimates 
did not differ between the schizophrenia patients and control subjects, but the patient group 
appeared to more readily translate lower probabilities into decisions. Consequently, patients with 
schizophrenia performed worse in terms of correct responses. 
These findings reconfirmed the JTC reasoning style and also demonstrated that this reasoning 
pattern is not a result of deficits in semantic knowledge generally, but relates to hasty or 
premature decision making. 
1.5.3 Jumping to Conclusions (JTC) 
The observation of arbitrary inferences (Kingdon & Turkington, 1991), a lack of active reality 
testing (Garety & Hemsley 1987), and both speedy and incautious thinking (John & Dodgson 
1994, Moritz & Woodward, 2005) in deluded patients may lead to a JTC data gathering bias. 
This bias might enhance the probability for the formation and maintenance of delusions, 
particularly in patients with schizophrenia. Here, the tendency to decide rapidly on the basis of 
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low evidence might be a protective mechanism taking into account the reduced cognitive 
capacity due to experiencing the world as an overwhelming flood of unfiltered, disorganized 
perceptual information (Hemsley, 1987). Similarly, a ‘need for closure’ (NFC) bias was 
suggested (Colbert & Peters, 2002) which holds that an overconfident and hasty reasoning style 
‘makes simple what is unmanageable and ambiguous’. 
1.6 Current Debates, Aims of the Present Thesis 
1.6.1 JTC and Its Relationship to Other Reasoning Biases 
In delusions, reasoning biases other than the JTC bias have been found, such as reduced belief 
flexibility (Garety et al., 2005), a Liberal Acceptance Bias (LA; Moritz & Woodward, 2004) and 
a Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE; Woodward et al, 2006b). However, it remains 
unclear whether these reasoning biases are independent or share common underpinnings. One 
aim of the current thesis is to reproduce documented reasoning abnormalities and, in addition, to 
find potential interactions with other reasoning deviations. Second, reasoning abnormalities other 
than JTC are under-explored and potentially play an important role in either the formation or the 
maintenance of delusions and are therefore considered with the aim to improve the 
characterization of reasoning patterns in delusions. 
Experiment 1 was designed both to replicate the JTC reasoning style in delusions, but also to test 
for the LA bias with a new paradigm that has not been employed before. In Experiment 2, the LA 
bias hypothesis was tested for two independent response options and, furthermore, the BADE 
was tested using neutral task material. 
1.6.2 State or Trait? 
Reasoning abnormalities, especially JTC, have been shown to be associated with delusions and 
are hypothesized to contribute to delusion formation and maintenance (Garety & Freeman, 1999; 
Fine et al., 2007). However, due to heterogeneous findings, based on varying methodologies and 
sample selections, there is currently a debate on the general character of reasoning biases in 
delusions (Garety & Peters, 2005; van Dael et al., 2006). 
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As delusions display considerable plasticity (Appelbaum et al., 2004), it is of interest whether 
risky reasoning is also unstable and accompanies delusion severity, thus representing a strong 
mechanistic factor and state-marker. If the JTC reasoning style is a general abnormality in 
conditions associated with delusions, independent of symptom severity, these reasoning 
abnormalities might only represent a general predisposition in patients with schizophrenia and 
other psychotic disorders. One approach to support a state-marker hypothesis is to cross-
sectionally test for JTC, LA and BADE with a sensitive paradigm and to employ various control 
conditions and control groups in order to rule out that these biases depend on characteristics 
other than delusions. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, reasoning patterns in delusions are 
considered with a new variation the of previously used beads task, potentially allowing more 
sensitive measures. In addition to currently delusional patients with schizophrenia, different 
kinds of control groups were included in order to be able to relate JTC, LA and BADE 
specifically to delusions. 
Longitudinal studies usually require more resources and are, therefore, conducted less frequently. 
However, longitudinal studies may provide even better clarification in the state-vs.–trait debate. 
This is reflected in Experiment 3, where a small sample was tested in a pre-post design in order 
to evaluate how the JTC bias correlates with delusion scores. 
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2 Experiment 1 
2.1 Introduction 
A number of probabilistic reasoning biases might contribute to the understanding of delusions, 
which are defined as 'fixed, false beliefs not amenable to contrary evidence' (DSM-IV-TR, APA, 
2000). In the present experiment, the 'jumping to conclusions' bias (JTC, Huq, Garety & 
Hemsley 1988), the 'liberal acceptance' bias (LA, Moritz, Woodward et al., 2004) and their 
potential interactions are considered. 
A JTC bias was found in a significant number of recent studies in deluded and delusion-prone 
individuals (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Fine et al., 2007), using various variations of the basic 
‘beads task’ (Huq et. al, 1988). However, the question as to whether JTC is a response pattern 
that is specifically associated with delusions or with schizophrenia in general is currently subject 
to controversial debates. A number of studies on probabilistic reasoning in psychosis did not 
include non-delusional schizophrenia control groups (Dudley et al., 1997(a), Garety et al., 1991, 
Huq et al., 1988, Young & Bentall, 1997) and could thus not address that debate. Other studies, 
including delusional patients with schizophrenia and non-delusional schizophrenia control 
subjects (e. g. Peters al., 1999), were not able to detect differences between delusional and non-
delusional schizophrenia patients and argue for delusions to be a trait-like rather than a state-like 
feature of schizophrenia. In contrast, in recent studies (Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Menon et al., 
2006), a JTC pattern was more pronounced for patients with higher delusion scores under certain 
experimental conditions. 
Several procedures have been employed to tap JTC. The ’draws to decision procedure’ hitherto 
displayed the most consistent findings (Fear & Healy, 1997; Garety et al., 1991, Garety and 
Freeman, 1999). In this procedure, the participants are asked after each bead if they reached a 
decision with respect to the source of the bead and the task is terminated once the participant has 
made his or her decision. Conversely, in a ’graded estimate procedure‘, first introduced by Young 
& Bentall (1997), participants are asked to rate certainty levels for one or the other jar to their 
best estimate after each bead, while the number of beads is fixed (e.g. 10 or 12). In this 
paradigm, the highest range of certainty rating closely imitates the response in a ’draws to 
decision’ procedure. Findings with this paradigm are more ambiguous (Fear & Healy 1997; 
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Dudley et al. 1997(b); Garety & Freeman 1999). Figure 3 illustrates the variations of the beads 
task. 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of the ‘draws to decision procedure’ and the ‘graded estimates procedure’ 
variation of the beads task. 
Complementary to the JTC account, the role of a LA bias was put forward (Moritz & Woodward, 
2004). This account predicts that patients with schizophrenia more liberally evaluate implausible 
response options. Using pictures from the Thematic Apperception Task (Aranow et al., 2001), the 
schizophrenia group generally responded with higher probability ratings, most pronounced for 
explanations considered highly implausible by healthy control subjects. 
While a JTC approach would imply a contribution to immediate and rapid formation of a 
delusional belief, a LA bias might represent a facilitating mechanism for the usually slow 
development of a delusional belief by repeatedly accepting interpretations that support an 
initially weak delusional hypothesis. For clarification, based on an external attributional style or 
theory of mind deficits, the formation of a person’s initial delusional belief that his or her food 
has been poisoned might be supported by a tendency to jump to conclusions. With a tendency to 
more liberally accept implausible interpretations, unspecific cues like seeing a police car can 
further contribute to the delusional idea that the police poisoned the food. 
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The LA account is supported by another study that used a variation of the beads task (Moritz et 
al., 2007b). While in an experimental condition with only two jars, a JTC-response pattern was 
present, the JTC effect disappeared when multiple competing alternatives were offered. Liberal 
acceptance of the less likely alternatives might lead to indecisiveness with respected to highly 
probable response alternatives and consequently inhibiting a pre-potent response in favor of the 
most likely alternative. In this context, it has been speculated that a LA account might be a more 
universal underpinning of delusions and might also be a more accurate model of delusion 
development and maintenance. 
In studies investigating response patterns in patients with delusions on probabilistic reasoning, 
emphasis was put on one response alternative (e.g. jar or container), typically the one with a 
higher likelihood. Young & Bentall (1997) required participants to decide in favor of one or the 
other bag and give an estimate for the chosen option on a probability scale from 1 (“definitely 
the bag with mostly green beads”) to 7 (“definitely the bag with mostly red beads”). Likewise, 
Moritz & Woodward (2005) recorded probability estimates for container A or container B using a 
probability scale ranging from 1 (“definitely Container A”) to 7 (“definitely Container B”). 
Recently, using a “Who wants to be a millionaire” paradigm as a variation of the “Twenty 
Questions Game” (John & Dodgson, 1994), probability rates for correct and incorrect judgments 
did not differ between patients with schizophrenia and healthy control subjects (Moritz et al., 
2006b). Notably, this study did not distinguish between delusional and non-delusional 
schizophrenia patients and did not include psychiatric controls. To the best of our knowledge, no 
previous study has investigated response patterns for both likely and unlikely response options in 
a variation of the beads task at the same time. 
The present experiment is a variation of the bead task, employing fish and lakes instead of beads 
and containers. Using a graded estimates design, the probability ratings for both response 
alternatives were recorded. 
With the experiment, several aims were pursued. First, testing four separate experimental groups 
(schizophrenia patients with delusions, schizophrenia patients without delusions, people with a 
psychiatric diagnosis other than schizophrenia, and healthy control subjects), we addressed the 
question of whether a JTC reasoning style is specifically associated with delusions. Starting from 
heterogeneous previous findings with JTC exclusively in delusional patients with schizophrenia 
or in both delusional and non-delusional patients with schizophrenia, we aimed to provide 
further clarification.  
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Second, by also recording probability estimates for response options with low probability rates, 
we aimed to investigate the response behavior of delusion-prone individuals for non-preferred 
response options of different probability levels. As putative underpinnings of delusions, higher 
ratings on less likely response options have been demonstrated for pictures from the TAT with 
potentially delusional content (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). The disappearance of the JTC effect 
towards the high probability jar in a paradigm using three low probability jars instead of one 
provided further indirect evidence for a LA bias (Moritz & Woodward, 2007a). In the same line, 
we hoped to tap a LA bias in neutral material directly by means of higher ratings for low 
probability response alternatives. 
Finally, we aimed for a clarification of the relationship between the tendency to jump to 
conclusions and the tendency to more readily accept hypotheses by means of a correlation 
analyses. 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
Three groups of people took part in the study: people with schizophrenia or schizoaffective 
disorder, people with affective disorders and healthy people with no psychiatric diagnosis or 
history. 
Thirty-nine patients, diagnosed with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder according to 
DSM-IV-TR criteria, were recruited from Riverview Hospital in Coquitlam, British Columbia, 
Canada. Fifteen patients with schizophrenia were considered actively delusional (SSPI 7 ≥ 3, see 
below), and 24 did not display delusions at the time of testing. The following diagnoses were 
recorded for the delusional group: schizoaffective (n = 10), paranoid (n = 4) and disorganized (n 
= 1). The following delusions were experienced: grandiose (n = 6), paranoid (n = 10), and 
Schneiderian (n = 4). 
The psychiatric control group consisted of 44 people diagnosed for affective spectrum disorders, 
with the following diagnoses, all obtained by experienced psychiatrists according to DSM-IV-
TR: Bipolar I (n = 35), Bipolar II (n = 5) and Major or Minor Depression (n = 4). 
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Twenty-nine people, drawn from hospital staff and the general population via advertisement and 
word-of-mouth, served as the healthy control group. 
All participants underwent an assessment battery consisting of the National Adult Reading Test 
(NART, Blair & Spreen, 1989) and the Ammons Quick Test (QT, Ammons & Ammons, 1962) in 
order to estimate premorbid and current IQ, as well as the Hollingshead Two factor Index of 
Social Position (Hollingshead, 1957) in order to assess maternal, paternal and the subjects’ social 
position. 
The National Adult Reading Test is a widely accepted method in clinical settings to estimate 
intelligence levels of English-speaking subjects and is commonly used in neuropsychological 
research. The Ammons Quick Test is a passive response-picture-vocabulary test and is a 
favorable method for individuals with working memory and attention-span deficits. The 
Hollingshead Two factor Index of Social Position is a largely accepted estimation of 
socioeconomic status. The index comprises an occupational scale and an educational scale. 
While both are 7-point scales, occupation is given a weight of seven and education is given a 
weight of four.  
Additionally, psychiatric patients were assessed by the Signs and Symptoms of Psychotic Illness 
scale (SSPI, Liddle et al., 2002). The SSPI is a rating scale that consists of 20 items, each with 
five points, in which 0 represents no pathology, 1 represents questionable pathology, and 2–4 
represent increasing severity of clear pathology. If schizophrenia patients rated 3 or above for 
SSPI 7 (the item representing delusion severity), they were considered delusional. 
Table 2 displays a comparison of group socio-demographic characteristics. Participants were not 
admitted if their IQ was less than 70, if they had primary or acquired brain damage or head 
injury (loss of consciousness for more than 10 minutes), or if they were HIV-positive. Ten 
participants (six in the psychiatric control group and four in the healthy control group) spoke 
English as their second language (ESL). Eye-sight under 20/40 (assessed corrected and 
bilaterally) or red-green blindness were also exclusion criteria. 
All patients diagnosed for schizophrenia were currently receiving atypical neuroleptics (most 
frequently clozapine: n = 18; olanzapine: n = 9; risperidone: n = 3; chlorpromazine equivalent 
dosage in mg: M = 225.25, SD = 129.03) (Bezchlibnyk-Butler & Jeffries, 2004).
  
Socio-demographic Parameters of the Sample 
 
Delusional 
schizophrenia 
patients 
(n=15) 
Nondelusional 
schizophrenia 
patients 
(n=24) 
Psychiatric 
controls 
(n=44) 
Healthy 
Controls 
(n=29) 
ANOVA; 
Chi-
square Group comparison 
Age 38.27±10.77 35.63±12.27 41.14±10.08 30.93±10.07 p<0.01 H<Ps, D; ND< Ps  
Gender (M/F) (10/5) (19/5) (18/26) (9/19) p<0.05  
Formal years of 
education 12.07±2.58 11.63±2.04 15.36±3.69 14.33±2.28 p<0.001 H, Ps > D, ND 
IQ – NART       
V IQ 103.84±10.18 102.73±7.52 107.97±8.78 107.01±9.76 NS  
P IQ 107.67±3.55 107.14±4.81 109.62±4.14 109.16±4.61 NS  
FSIQ 106.01±6.59 105.04±8.92 109.63±7.7 108.79±8.55 NS  
IQ –QT 101.73±8.34 103.5±11.38 106.84±11.59 103.33±12.75 NS  
Social status 49.2±13.06 56.04±12.87 40.16±12.92 38.91±12.28 p < 0.001 H, Ps < D, ND 
Maternal Social status 49.67±12.39 38.32±16.79 37.81±18.84 39.87±14.53 NS  
Paternal Social Status 38.5±14.01 35.47±17.09 32.70±15.58 36.18±14.69 NS  
Illness duration (years) 18±9.64 12.91±10.44 15.04±11.33 n/a NS  
SSPI total 15.67±5.05 12.46±5.59 10.23±6.58 n/a p<0.05 D > Ps 
Delusions (SSPI 7) 3.47±0.52 0.87±0.87 0.45±0.73 n/a p<0.001 D > Ps, ND; ND > Ps 
Table 2: Psychopathological and socio-demographic characteristics of the samples. Mean values are accompanied by standard deviations (in 
brackets)
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2.2.2 Experiment 
Using Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0, we constructed a computerized variation of the 
probabilistic beads task, following the ‘graded estimates’ approach of Young & Bentall (1997). 
Instead of beads and containers, participants were presented with fish and lakes. Fishing might 
be more familiar to participants than the artificially created situation of drawing beads from a jar 
and thus lead to more intuitive responses while the material might still be neutral with respect to 
delusional content (e.g. paranoid). 
In between two lakes, each of which containing black and white fish in a certain proportion, a 
fisherman was displayed. Analogous to the draws of beads, the fisherman caught either a black 
or a white fish, one at a time. The lake on the left was named “Lake A” and the lake on the right 
was named “Lake B”. A total of six Tasks were employed, with 10 fish catches for each task. 
In all experimental tasks, the lakes were completely visible and the setup of the lakes remained 
the same. Prior to the administration of the tasks, the experimenter read all the instructions. After 
the start of Task 1, no further information was given by the experimenter. The proportions of fish 
in the lakes were not stated by the experimenter or displayed on the screen but were to be 
estimated by the participants. 
After the initial scene, which showed the two lakes and the fisherman, the first fish was 
presented in his hands. Subsequently, the fish would be put back into the lake (so that the actual 
ratios would not change) and another fish would be caught, again visible in the fisherman’s 
hands. 
After each fish, participants were required to decide the probability that the fish was caught from 
Lake A and the probability that the fish was caught from Lake B, according to his or her best 
estimate. A probability scale from 0 to 10 was employed for both lakes on a horizontal bar and 
the participant indicated his or her rating by a mouse-click along the scale (0 = very unlikely, 2.5 
= unlikely, 5= possible, 7.5 = likely, 10 = very likely). The ratings for the both lakes were 
independent of each other. High ratings for Lake A did not necessarily exclude the possibility of 
high ratings for Lake B. The instructions are given in the Appendix (Part I). 
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Figure 4: Illustration of the task procedure, here Task 4 with Lake A (50%/50%) and Lake B 
(20%/80%). Independent ratings were made for both lakes on two independent scrollbars. 
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The same procedure was repeated until the likelihood for the tenth fish was rated. Hereafter, the 
next task was employed. Probability rates for Lake A and Lake B were recorded to one decimal 
place.  
The actual color of the fish caught and the positions of the lakes were randomly varied and 
counterbalanced in all tasks to avoid effects of preferred colors or lake positions. Except for Task 
1 and Task 5, the distracter Tasks, all ten fish in a task were of the same color. Subsequently, the 
numerator in a ratio refers to the color of the caught fish, and the denominator to the opposite 
color.  
In our experimental tasks, we employed the same color of fish for all the 10 catches. We were 
particularly interested in how participants rate probabilities with low evidence (1 or 2 fish) and 
how additional information affects their ratings. In a controlled manner, we aimed to assess the 
effect of a new piece of information on the previous hypothesis.  
The proportions of black and white fish in the lakes were different in each task. An overview of 
the ratios in Tasks 2, 3, 4 and 6 is given in Table 3. For the data analysis, the ratings for the lake 
with the higher proportion of fish of the same color as the caught fish (“Lake 1”) were compared 
between groups, as well as the corresponding lake with the lower proportions (“Lake 2”), 
(regardless of color of the fish or the position of the lakes). 
Task Lake 1 Lake 2 
Task 2 80%:20% 20%:80% 
Task 3 80%:20% 50%:50% 
Task 4 50%:50% 20%:80% 
Task 6 50%:50% 50%:50% 
Table 3: Ratios of fish in lakes in Task 2, 3, 4 and 6 
Sequence of Fish and Ratios of Lakes in Distracter Tasks (Task 1 and Task 5) 
Task 1 and Task 5 were designed as distracter conditions. The ratios of the lakes are displayed in 
Table 4. 
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Task Lake 1 Lake 2 
Task 1 50%:50% 20%:80% 
Task 5 80%:20% 50%:50% 
Table 4: Ratios of fish in lakes in distracter Tasks 1 and 5 
The color of the caught fish was varied in the following order (B = black; W = white): 
Task 1: W-B-W-B-B-W-B-W-W-B 
Task 5: B-W-B-B-B-B-W-B-B-B 
These two tasks were designed in order to avoid predictable patterns in the experimental tasks, 
where the color of the caught fish did not change.  
Experimental Tasks (Task 2, 3, 4 and 6) 
These Tasks were designed for testing the hypotheses of JTC across various conditions. For the 
LA hypothesis, Task 2 and Task 4 were of particular interest. With a portion of only 20% of fish 
in the critical color, the least probable non-preferred response options were given in these Tasks. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Sociodemographic Parameters 
One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and follow-up t-tests revealed that the experimental 
groups differed in age, gender and years of education. However, all groups were matched for 
estimated premorbid and current IQ. According to the Hollingshead Two-Factor Index of Social 
Position (Hollingshead, 1957), both deluded and non-deluded schizophrenia patients had lower 
social positions than the psychiatric and healthy control subjects, but did not display differences 
for parental social positions, indicating similar socioeconomic backgrounds. 
The influence of age on task performance is controversial (John & Dogson, 1994; Kemp et al., 
1997). Introducing age and gender as covariates, we determined that, for each parameter, there 
was no impact of these factors on task performance. Generally, gender is not considered to have 
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an effect on probabilistic reasoning tasks (Garety & Freeman, 1999) and didn’t impact 
performance in our task.   
Notably, the deluded and non-deluded schizophrenia group did not differ for any of the 
demographic variables. Also, patient participants were matched for the duration of illness. 
Delusional patients scored higher than psychiatric controls and non-deluded patients on the SSPI. 
All psychiatric control subjects were non-delusional except for one bipolar patient (SSPI 7 = 3). 
Likewise, deluded psychotic patients had higher total SSPI scores than psychiatric controls. 
Notably, the healthy control group was not assessed with the SSPI. 
2.3.2 Behavioral Data 
Distracter Tasks 
Task 1 and Task 5 were designed as distracter conditions. For these tasks, the participants 
performed in the expected manner and no group differences were detected. 
JTC 
If participants gave an extreme rating after the first catch (over 9 or under 1), this was considered 
a JTC bias. All ratings after the first fish in all tasks were included in the analysis. A univariate 
ANOVA revealed a trend to a main effect of Group (F = 2.47, df = 2, p = 0.06) for ratings over 9 
after the first fish. Although this ANOVA did not reach statistical significance, group differences 
were analyzed with ‘difference contrasts’, with the group orders as follows: healthy controls, 
psychiatric controls, non-delusional schizophrenia patients, delusional schizophrenia patients. 
With this group ordering, difference contrasts provide a one-degree-of-freedom test for a 
difference between the two control groups (contrast: -1 1 0 0), the difference between all controls 
and the non-delusional patients with schizophrenia (contrast: -.5 -.5 1 0) and the difference 
between all non-delusional groups and delusional schizophrenia patients (contrast: -.333 -.333 -
.333 1). The analysis revealed that delusional patients scored higher than all the other groups (p 
= 0.01, contrast: -.333 -.333 -.333 1) while no other group differences were observed (p = 0.6, 
contrast: -.5 -.5 1 0; p = 0.9; contrast: -1 1 0 0). Group differences in probability ratings greater 
than 9 were not observed at the end of the tasks (fish 10).  
 An overview over the numbers of JTC-responses is displayed in Figure 1. 
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Figure 4: Number of extreme responses for preferred lakes  
No group differences were detected for extreme decisions after the first catch in the low range (< 
1). 
2.3.3 Experimental Tasks 
For the analysis of the four experimental tasks (Task 2, Task 3, Task 4 and Task 6), three periods 
were considered: the beginning (catches 1 and 2), the middle (catches 5 and 6) and the end 
(catches 9 and 10). We conducted an ANOVA with repeated measures to test for the main effects 
of Group (deluded, non – deluded, psychiatric controls, healthy controls), the main effect of 
Condition (beginning, middle, end), and for Group by Condition interactions. 
As before, group differences were analyzed with ‘difference contrasts’, with the identical group 
order. Likewise, the difference between the two control groups (contrast: -1 1 0 0), the difference 
between all controls and the non-delusional patients with schizophrenia (contrast: -.5 -.5 1 0) and 
the difference between all non-delusional groups and delusional patients (contrast: -.333 -.333 -
.333 1) were calculated. 
2.3.4 Non-Preferred Lakes with Low Probabilities (20%:80%) 
The overall performance of the four groups on Task 2 and Task 4 are illustrated in Figure 2. In 
Task 2, the lake with the 80%/20% ratio for the critical fish color was compared against the lake 
2 Experiment 1 
Page 23 
with the 20%/80% ratio. In Task 5, the lake with the 50%/50% ratio was compared against the 
lake with the 20%/80% ratio in the critical color. All four groups rated similarly for the preferred 
lakes, in other words, the lakes with the higher proportion of fish with the same color as the fish 
caught (80% and 50%, respectively). There were no group differences for this task. 
However, for the non-preferred lakes, both with a portion of 20% of fish in the critical color, 
patients with schizophrenia who also displayed delusions, rated consistently higher than all other 
experimental groups. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of Group for the non-
preferred lakes in both tasks (F = 3.659; df = 3; p < 0.05; respectively F = 2.817; df = 3; p < 
0.05). Neither the between group contrast between the control groups (p = 0.2 in Task 2, p = 0.3 
in Task 4) nor the contrast between all controls and non-delusional patients with schizophrenia (p 
= 0.5 in Task 2, p = 0.4 in Task 4) showed any significant differences. Delusional schizophrenia 
patients differed from all the other groups in Task 2 (p < 0.05) and Task 4 (p < 0.05). 
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Figure 5: Average ratings in Task 2 and Task 4 for preferred and non-preferred lakes (means and standard errors of the mean). 
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2.3.5 Development of Ratings During the Duration of a Task 
In many cases, non-deluded participants changed their more conservative ratings at the 
beginning to more extreme ratings by the end of the task. 
There was no preferred lake in Task 6 since the ratio was 50%/50% for both lakes. In all other 
experimental tasks (Task 2, Task 3 and Task 4), a main effect of Condition (F = 8.95, df = 2, p < 
0.001; F = 7.90, df = 2, p < 0.05; F = 8.68, df = 2, p < 0.001) was observed for the probability 
ratings of the preferred lakes. The mean increase in ratings from the beginning to the end was 
1.06 rating points in Task 2, 0.87 rating points in Task 3 and 1.14 rating points in Task 4. 
However, there were no Group by Condition interactions. 
Regarding the ratings of non-preferred lakes, a main effect of Condition was only detected in 
Task 4 (F = 5.58, df = 2, p < 0.01). On average, ratings were 0.46 rating points lower at the end 
compared to the beginning. 
2.3.6 Correlation of Jumping to Conclusions and Liberal 
Acceptance 
In our experiment, both a JTC pattern and a LA pattern were present in delusional patients. 
However, the question remains as to whether the JTC effect and the LA effect share common 
underpinnings. 
In order to test for the correlation between JTC with a LA response pattern, all responses for the 
non-preferred lakes in Task 2 and Task 4 were combined into one variable. There was a 
correlation between JTC and an LA response pattern (Pearsons correlation r(df) = 3; p < 0.05). 
However, introducing a LA response variable pattern as a covariate, contrasts between delusional 
patients and the other control groups remained significant (p < 0.05; contrast: -.333 -.333 -.333 
1), indicating that the difference in the JTC response pattern is independent of the tendency to 
LA responses. 
Also, while a univariate ANOVA with ‘difference contrasts’ showed a clear LA response pattern 
(F = 3.81, df = 3, p < 0.05; p < 0.001, contrast: -.333 -.333 -.333 1), introducing the number of 
JTC responses as a covariate, between group contrasts (-.333 -.333 -.333 1) remained significant 
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(p < 0.05). Thus, the tendency to a LA bias for unlikely response options does not share a 
common effect with the tendency to jump to conclusions. 
2.4 Discussion 
The present results both confirm and extend the current understanding of the role of probabilistic 
reasoning in the formation and maintenance of delusions. With the present fish paradigm, using 
two response options, the deluded group made significantly more extremely high ratings for the 
preferred response after the first catch, while all control groups displayed more cautious ratings 
with the small amount of evidence provided by only one fish. 
In accordance with previous studies, patients with schizophrenia displayed more hasty and firm 
decisions on the basis of low evidence, which has been described as a ‘jumping to conclusions’ 
(JTC) bias. With the procedure and the sample used in the present study, a JTC tendency was 
clearly associated with delusions. None of the control groups displayed a JTC pattern; only the 
delusional patients with schizophrenia did. Studies that also compared delusional and non-
delusional individuals with schizophrenia that did not find between-group differences (e.g. Peters 
et al., 1999) may not have had high enough statistical power to reveal an effect under the 
majority of the conditions. 
On the other hand, the paradigm of the present study, using two independent response options, 
might represent a more powerful procedure to characterize the JTC pattern of delusional versus 
non-delusional populations. To our best knowledge, this ‘graded estimates’ variation of the beads 
task, with two response options, was not used in a similar experiment before. This procedure 
gives participants the option to rate high for a preferred option as well as high for the non-
preferred option, since the probabilities for both options do not necessarily have to be integrated 
in one rating as in a pure graded estimates procedure (Young & Bentall, 1997). As JTC was not 
observed for low-probability options, an early rejection hypothesis (Garety & Hemsley, 1994) 
was not supported. In contrast, our data suggest that JTC is present in response options with high 
probabilities. 
Also in the line with previous findings, there was a tendency for delusional patients with 
schizophrenia to more readily accept response options with low likelihoods (in our experiment 
lakes with a portion of only 20% of fish in the critical color). Delusional individuals made 
significantly higher ratings in both Task 2 and Task 4 (see Figure 5). 
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These findings were first observed in a variation of the Thematic Apperception Task and labeled 
a Liberal Acceptance Bias (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). Patients with schizophrenia displayed 
higher ratings than control groups, especially for response options that were deemed to be very 
unlikely by healthy control subjects. While that study employed pictures and offered potential 
explanations as response options, the present experiment confirms the hypothesis of a LA bias in 
delusions with  more neutral material and consequently less confounded by potentially 
delusional content. In contrast to the study of Moritz & Woodward (2004), where people 
diagnosed for schizophrenia were compared to healthy control subjects, the present investigation 
demonstrated a LA pattern specifically in delusional patients versus all other control groups. 
The data do not support a strict formulation of a JTC account, which assumes that (deluded) 
schizophrenia patients make early firm decisions for one response alternative only. Delusional 
individuals proved to more readily consider two response options. In a related experiment, using 
a classical beads task design, a JTC pattern, which has been observed for a one-response option 
design with two containers, was not observed in a more ambiguous design when four containers 
were displayed (Moritz et al., 2006b). This indicates that a fast decision was attenuated by the 
presence of a larger number of hypotheses held in simultaneous contemplation. In the present 
study, this over-contemplation was explicitly recorded. Delusional patients showed a reduced 
readiness to enclose a certain hypothesis in ambiguous situations, which fits well with the 
finding that deluded patients experience themselves as indecisive (Freeman et al., 2005). 
Consequently, not only a strict formulation of the JTC account, but also the need for closure 
(NFC) account (Colbert & Peters, 2002), that predicts that psychotic patients make hasty 
decisions in order to reduce ambiguity, must be challenged.  
Notably, a LA pattern was not present for all unlikely response options. In Task 3, where there 
was one lake with 80% and another lake with 50% of fish in the critical color, deluded patients 
did not significantly differ from the control groups in ratings for the 50% lake. Group differences 
only became evident for response options with very low probabilities (20%) and were 
convincingly consistent. 
In summary, besides a JTC tendency for high probability rates, there is growing evidence for an 
over-acceptance of hypotheses with extremely low probabilities, a feature that deluded 
participants did not share with any of the control groups. Consequently, the formation and 
maintenance of delusional beliefs appears to not only be based on quick, firm decisions in 
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situations with low ambiguity, but also the increased likelihood of considering less likely 
hypotheses.  
The acceptance of alternative interpretations that are deemed very unlikely by healthy control 
persons also covers another aspect of delusions. The definition of delusions also includes the 
following phrase: ‘The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's 
culture or subculture (e.g. it is not an article of religious faith)’ (DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000). Often, 
healthy people cannot understand or even imagine what a delusional person thinks and believes 
and find delusional people very strange, leading to avoidance of deluded people. Frequently, 
individuals suffering from delusions sooner or later become outsiders, isolated and socially 
marginalized. LA might be an important factor in explaining the difference between delusional 
and unimpaired thinking and its interpersonal and social consequences. 
In contrast to a single (isolated) JTC account, the combination of JTC and LA might represent a 
more accurate contribution to the understanding of delusions. Delusional, fixed beliefs usually 
evolve stepwise, as LA would explain and may be triggered by quick and incautious decision-
making processes in favor of one response alternative. A pure JTC account would imply a quick 
development of delusional systems and the rejection of unlikely hypotheses. However, 
probabilistic reasoning abnormalities are not sufficient to explain formation of delusional ideas. 
Here, different aspects of the multifactorial model (Freeman, 2007), such as misattributions and 
theory of mind deficits, are of importance. The role of JTC and LA is to facilitate the formation 
and maintenance of delusional ideas.  
Despite the consistent finding of an over-acceptance of improbable hypotheses resulting from, 
for example, misattributions or theory of mind deficits, the experiment did not address the 
question of which mechanisms might contribute to LA. Several putative possibilities can be 
considered. First, delusional patients might have a reduced threshold for accepting a hypothesis 
with low evidence and as such not dismiss it as early as healthy people would do. Second, 
delusional patients might display a tendency not to take into account all the information that 
would lead a healthy person to deem an alternative as impossible. As such, LA might be a matter 
of data gathering, which is also supported by several studies that characterized delusional 
patients with schizophrenia as displaying working memory deficits (Manoach, 2003) and a faulty 
attentional filter (e.g. Mathalon et al., 2004). Secondly, research investigating error detection 
found patients with schizophrenia to display impaired error detection (review: vVeen & Carter, 
2006). To address this issue, investigations including physiological parameters, especially frontal 
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lobe function measures, might be necessary. Thirdly, impaired semantic memory (McKenna, 
1991; Tamlyn et al., 1992) was found in deluded individuals. Faulty, delusional hypotheses 
might not contradict with an individual’s stored semantic knowledge and as such be more readily 
accepted. 
The association of JTC and LA with current high delusion scores, and non-deluded participants 
(partly in regression) not showing that pattern speaks for JTC and LA as involved in both the 
formation and the maintenance of delusions. Furthermore, we suggest that delusion is a state-like 
rather than a trait-like feature of schizophrenia. If so, the association of delusions with JTC (and 
LA) would predict that the presence of JTC fluctuates as a function of delusion severity. This 
prediction will be considered in Experiment 3. 
However, other data suggest that JTC is also present in non-delusional people who are not 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, but display high delusional ideation (Colbert & Peters, 2002), and 
a previously delusional population has been found to display a JTC response pattern while in 
remission (Peters & Garety, 2006). Notably, Colbert & Peters (2002), examined non-delusional 
populations and found that the scores for a ‘beads to certainty scale’ were much higher (M = 
5.12) than the scores delusional patients usually display. They observed no group differences in 
‘initial certainty’, which was used as a JTC-measure. Peters & Garety (2006) lacked of non-
deluded schizophrenia controls and, in addition, the criteria for a participant to be regarded as 
delusional were relatively high. 
As JTC and LA both occur in delusions, we were interested in whether or not JTC and LA share 
common underpinnings. Earlier studies suggested LA to be a more general feature that also 
explains a JTC reasoning style, due to lowered probability thresholds for the acceptance of a 
hypothesis (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). However, correlation analyses revealed that JTC and 
LA are both correlated with delusions, but that there is no significant overlap of JTC and LA. 
Consequently, JTC and LA appear to be independent probabilistic reasoning biases that both 
contribute to delusions as complementary factors. 
In future, investigations of JTC and LA might focus on several issues. In the present experiment, 
both delusional and non-delusional schizophrenia participants were included. However, with 15 
individuals in the delusional group, statistical power was limited. The differences of age and 
gender between the experimental groups further limits the power our findings. Testing larger 
samples might allow the measurement of effects that are not detectable with a smaller sample 
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and, additionally, allow investigation of relationships between the various reasoning aberrations 
in delusions. Also, the relationship of other consistent characteristics of delusional ideation (e. g. 
‘theory of mind’ deficits; Frith, 1992) might be investigated in order to improve the current 
model of delusion formation and maintenance. In order to address the state vs. trait debate, a 
longitudinal study with delusional participants is required. This will be reflected in Experiment 
3. 
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3 Experiment 2 
3.1 Introduction 
Deviations of probabilistic reasoning in delusional individuals are well established and the JTC 
bias (see Experiment 1) has been frequently replicated (Garety & Freeman 1999, Fine et al., 
2007). However, the JTC pattern was not seen in all studies and it appears that only certain 
methodologies are sensitive to JTC (Menon et al., 2006; Experiment 1). Recently, it was found 
that delusional patients who usually jump to conclusions do not display such a reasoning bias in 
more ambiguous experimental conditions, e.g. in a beads task with four jars instead of two 
(Moritz et al., 2006b). It appears that delusional patients, more than controls, consider 
implausible hypotheses. The lack of a JTC pattern in more ambiguous situations represents the 
second prediction of the LA account: With lower subjective certainty, for example, seeing more 
jars with various portions of beads, the JTC effect disappears. A manipulation of the visible part 
of the lakes in our fish paradigm might be another way to create a situation of reduced subjective 
certainty. A more cautious response style in delusional individuals on the ‘fish task’ would 
enhance the role of LA in the formation and maintenance of delusions. Revealing the lakes in ten 
steps after each catch, beginning with a very small section (4 or 5 fish), we were interested in the 
response style on this probabilistic reasoning paradigm as a first goal of the present experiment. 
In a Bayesian model of belief, it is of particular interest, how individuals integrate new pieces of 
information relative to their prior beliefs (Fischoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983).  Strong beliefs might 
evolve through two mechanisms of dealing with new information: 
A. The integration of confirmatory evidence 
B. The discarding of disconfirmatory evidence  
An increased tendency to integrate confirmatory evidence and/or a heightened tendency to 
discard disconfirmatory evidence ultimately leads to an over-fixation of beliefs. The 
investigation of the maintenance of delusions must address these two processes. If delusional 
individuals more readily integrate information consistent with their beliefs and, at the same time, 
more readily reject incongruent information, this may be an elegant approach to the nature of 
'fixed, false beliefs' (DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000). 
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Based on the mathematical Bayesian model, Huq, Garety & Hemsley (1988) first employed the 
‘beads’ task and found biases in the process of integrating confirmatory evidence in patients with 
schizophrenia. Subsequent research efforts led to models such as the 'Jumping to Conclusions' 
bias (Garety & Hemsley, 1991), the 'Need for Closure' bias (Colbert & Peters 2002), which have 
focused on abnormalities in the integration of confirmatory information and provided evidence 
that delusional people more readily consider delusion-congruent information. Moreover, these 
studies also focused more on the formation than the maintenance of delusions. 
Recently, it has been observed that individuals with delusions also display a cognitive Bias 
Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE, Woodward et al., 2006). This account predicts that 
delusional patients are more resistant to information that contradicts the already formed 
hypothesis. With an elegant experimental design, the effect of BADE became obvious: 
Participants were presented with pictures in the style of a cartoon strip of three pictures. First, 
they only saw the last picture and were requested to rate the probabilities of four given 
alternative interpretations. In a second and a third step, the previous pictures were shown and the 
interpretation options were given again. With the additional pictures, the content of the last 
picture changed in favor of an interpretation that seemed very unlikely in the beginning (Figure 
6). 
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Figure 6: Cartoon series of three pictures employed by Woodward et al., 2006* 
While the non-deluded schizophrenia and healthy control group often changed their initial 
interpretations, deluded patients more often adhered to their initial interpretation. In a Bayesian 
framework, inferential processing of delusional individuals seems to be biased with respect to 
new pieces of information. If new pieces of information are congruent, they appear to be more 
influential than incongruent new pieces of information, which would increase the likelihood of 
an alternative interpretation. As such, delusional patients proved to be more resistant to new 
information that supports a hypothesis different from their previous beliefs. While JTC and LA 
appear important to enhance the probability of the formation of delusional ideas resulting from 
external hypotheses, BADE might represent a mechanism to maintain their internalized 
delusional systems. 
The following experiment was designed to test two hypotheses: first, we aimed to investigate 
response behavior in a more ambiguous situation, reflected by smaller sections of the lakes in the 
beginning, hoping to find further support for a LA bias. Second, the hypothesis of a Bias Against 
Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) was tested with neutral task material, manipulating factors of 
                                                 
*
 Having seen the third picture only, response options 1), 2) and 4) might appear reasonable. Most non-delusional individuals 
change their response towards 3) after seeing the second and first picture, while (deluded) schizophrenia patients were found to 
be less flexible. 
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the Bayesian model of belief. Delusional patients were expected to hold firmly with initial 
ratings while the ratios of fish move to the opposite.  
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
The sample was the same as in Experiment 1. All sample characteristics can be reviewed in 
Experiment 1. Experiment 2 was administered in the same session, after the administration of 
Experiment 1. 
3.2.2 Material 
Participants were presented with the fisherman variation of the ‘graded estimates’ procedure used 
in Experiment 1. Again, the experiment consisted of 6 Tasks, each with 10 catches of fish, and 
participants were requested to make probability ratings for both lakes after each fish. In all tasks, 
the color of the caught fish remained the same during the task. 
Instead of the complete view of the lakes, only a partial view was given to start with. Prior to the 
catch of the first fish, only a small section of the lake (e.g. 4 or 5 fish) was visible, with the rest 
covered by a black layer (e.g. mud). Subsequently, the lake was revealed in ten steps, and for the 
very last fish, the entire lake was visible. The participants were introduced to this version of the 
task by the experimenter and they were allowed to ask questions before they were presented with 
Task 1. After that, no further information was given by the experimenter. Again, ‘Lake 1’ refers 
to the lake with the larger portion of fish in the critical color and ‘Lake 2’ to the remaining lake. 
The instructions are given in the Appendix (Part II). 
3.2.3 Conditions 
Constant Lakes 
In Task 1, 3, 4 and 6, the portions of fish in the two lakes remained the same during the task. An 
overview over the ratios is given in Table 5. 
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Task Lake 1 Lake 2 
Task 1 80%:20% 20%:80% 
Task 3 80%:20% 50%:50% 
Task 4 50%:50% 20%:80% 
Task 6 50%:50% 50%:50% 
Table 5: Ratios of fish in lakes in Tasks 1, 3, 4 & 6 
Variable Lakes 
In Task 2 and Task 5, the ratios of one lake were different from catch to catch. With the lakes 
being revealed in ten steps, the portions could be manipulated with every additionally visible 
fish. For Task 2 and Task 5, one of the two Lakes (“Lake 1”) had variable proportions of black 
and white fish. The numerator in the ratio refers to the color of the caught fish, the denominator 
refers to the remaining color. 
An overview over the ratios of fish in lakes in Task 2 is given in Table 6. An overview for Task 5 
is given in Table 7. 
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Trial (Fish) Lake 1(variable) Lake 2(constant) 
Fish 1 50%:50% 80%:20% 
Fish 2 40%:60% 80%:20% 
Fish 3 30%:70% 80%:20% 
Fish 4 20%:80% 80%:20% 
Fish 5 30%:70% 80%:20% 
Fish6 40%:60% 80%:20% 
Fish 7 50%:50% 80%:20% 
Fish 8 60%:40% 80%:20% 
Fish 9 70%:30% 80%:20% 
Fish 10 80%:20% 80%:20% 
Table 6: Ratios of fish in lakes in Task 2 with the extreme ratios in bold 
Trial (catch) Lake 1(variable) Lake 2(constant) 
Fish 1 50%:50% 20%:80% 
Fish 2 60%:40% 20%:80% 
Fish 3 70%:30% 20%:80% 
Fish 4 80%:20% 20%:80% 
Fish 5 70%:30% 20%:80% 
Fish 6 60%:40% 20%:80% 
Fish 7 50%:50% 20%:80% 
Fish 8 40%:60% 20%:80% 
Fish 9 30%:70% 20%:80% 
Fish 10 20%:80% 20%:80% 
Table 7: Ratios of fish in lakes in Task 5 with the extreme ratios in bold 
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Overall, for the first draw, the ratio of fish in both lakes in one of the tasks of Experiment 1 
corresponded to one of the tasks in Experiment 2, which allows a direct comparison of extreme 
responding after the first catch.  
For the data analysis, three ratings in Task 2 and Task 5 were analyzed: the rating after the first 
catch (starting point), the rating after the fourth fish (lower extreme in Task 2 and upper extreme 
in Task 5), and, finally, the rating after the very last catch (upper extreme in Task 5 and lower 
extreme in Task 2), where the ratios in both lakes were equal. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 JTC (Lake 1 to 6) 
Consistent with Experiment 1, ratings greater than nine were considered a JTC response. In this 
experiment, there were no significant between group differences and the JTC effect was not 
observed. 
Development of Ratings During the Task 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed to test for the main effects of Group (deluded, non 
– deluded, psychiatric controls, healthy controls), the main effect of Condition (fish 1, fish 4, fish 
10), and the Group by Condition interactions. 
3.3.2 Constant Lakes (Task 1, 3, 4 & 6) 
Preferred Lakes 
For Lake 1, a main effect of Condition was observed in Task 1(F = 20.32, df = 2, p < 0.001), 
Task 3 (F = 29.35, df = 2, p < 0.001), Task 4 (F = 18.87, df = 2, p < 0.001) and Task 6 (F = 6.71, 
df = 2, p < 0.05), indicating a tendency to be more cautious with a small section of the lake in the 
beginning and rating more extreme at the end when the entire lake was visible. 
Non-Preferred Lakes 
For Lake 2, the ANOVA did not reveal an effect of Condition in any of the Tasks. In Task 3, a 
main effect of Group was close to significance (F = 2.645, df = 3, p = 0.06) as well as the 
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contrast between delusional patients and the control groups (p = 0.06). Apart from this task, no 
group differences were observed for the non-preferred lakes. 
3.3.3 Variable Lakes (Task 2 and Task 5) 
Both in Task 2 and Task 5, a main effect of Condition was observed for the variable lakes (F = 
19.916, df = 2, p < 0.001, respectively F = 11.040, df = 2, p < 0.001). In Task 2, there was also a 
main effect of Group (F = 4.765, df = 3, p < 0.05). Post-hoc t-tests revealed that this was due to 
delusional patients rating significantly lower than healthy control subjects (p < 0.001) and non-
delusional schizophrenia controls (p < 0.01). 
The pattern of the initial data analysis looked promising and it appeared that delusional as well 
as non-delusional patients displayed a bias against disconfirmatory evidence, since they 
displayed smaller mean changes during the tasks than the other control groups. However, the 
differences between groups in mean rating changes from one extreme point to the other (e.g. fish 
4 and fish 10) did not reach statistical significance. 
For the complementary constant lakes, there was a main effect of Condition (F = 11.065, df = 2, 
p < 0.001, respectively F=11.040, df =2, p < 0.001) while no effect of Group was observed. 
3.3.4 Bayesian Model 
For the hypothesis of a BADE, Tasks 2 and 5 were of particular interest. In order to compare the 
performance of participants with the Bayesian model, likelihoods for the hypothesis that the fish 
actually comes from one of the lakes were calculated for both lakes. ‘Prior odds’ were acquired 
from the ratio of fish for the first fish and from prior inferential processes for all the remaining 
fish. The new ratio of fish in the lake and the color of fish in the fisherman’s hand after a catch 
formed the term ‘likelihood ratio’. Then, the ‘posterior odds’ were calculated. For the following 
fish, the ‘posterior odds’ formed the ‘prior odds’ for the inferential process of the next ‘catch’ 
(Fischoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983). 
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Trial (catch) Task 2 Task 5 
Fish 1 50%:50% 50%:50% 
Fish 2 40%:60% 60%:40% 
Fish 3 22%:78% 78%:22% 
Fish 4 7%:93% 93%:7% 
Fish 5 3%:97% 97%:3% 
Fish 6 2%:98% 98%:2% 
Fish 7 2%:98% 98%:2% 
Fish 8 3%:97% 98%:2% 
Fish 9 7%:93% 93%:6% 
Fish 10 22%:78% 78%:22% 
Table 8: Task 2 and Task 5, likelihood ratios for Lake 1 to be (nominator)/not to be 
(denominator) the origin lake of the fish calculated after a Bayesian model 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate response patterns for the variable lakes during the entire duration 
of Task 2 and Task 5 for all 4 experimental groups. Additionally, the Figures show the response 
patterns predicted by the Bayesian model. 
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Figure 7: Response patterns and predictions of the Bayesian Model in Task 2 
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Figure 8: Response patterns and predictions of the Bayesian Model in Task 5 
3.4 Discussion 
In contrast to Experiment 1, a JTC effect was not detected. With a smaller section of the lakes 
visible, all groups consistently displayed more caution in the beginning, making more extreme 
ratings towards the end of the tasks, when larger portions of the lakes were visible. As such, the 
JTC effect appears to be dependent on low-ambiguity situations. Seeing only a small section of 
the lake, none of the groups felt ready to make firm, early decisions. The delusional group might 
consider several possible scenarios in this low-certainty situation, compared to Experiment 1. 
This finding supports a liberal acceptance (LA) hypothesis which predicts a diminished JTC 
effect in situations of higher ambiguity (Moritz et al., 2008). In all other studies that described a 
JTC response pattern (Huq et. al, 1988; Garety & Hemsley, 1991; Dudley & Over, 2003; Moritz 
et al., 2006b), participants were provided relatively complete information (e. g. fully visible jars 
of beads). 
However, two manifestations of the LA account might be distinguished: in Experiment 1, 
delusional participants displayed higher acceptance of less probable response options, which is a 
positive manifestation of the LA bias as it has been observed using the TAT (Woodward et al., 
2006). In the present experiment, we observed a negative manifestation of the LA bias in 
delusional individuals, where the JTC of Experiment 1 effect was inhibited by the higher 
ambiguity at the beginning of the task, comparable to the experiment of Moritz et al. (2008). 
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Put differently, it is not only the pure information that seems to be of significant for decision 
making, but also how valid the information appears to an individual and how the information is 
weighted. Seeing a small part of the lake with 4 or 5 fish obviously provides less certainty than 
seeing the entire lake with more than 60 fish. JTC appears to be a feature of delusional ideation 
which is dependent on the subject’s perception how complete a piece of information is. It has 
often been argued that deluded schizophrenia patients make hasty decisions based on ‘little 
evidence’ (Garety & Hemsley, 1991; Garety and Freeman, 1999). In experiments where JTC was 
observed, delusional participants made premature decisions without requesting more potentially 
available information. So, with having all the information on the fish in the lakes, deluded 
patients use that available information and show a JTC pattern. Conversely, the do not respond 
hastily when the given information that only provides them with a lower grade of subjective 
certainty. 
This provides further evidence for a data gathering bias rather than a basically biased 
probabilistic reasoning and supports previous findings (Garety and Freeman, 1999, p 131). In a 
clinical scenario, this would mean that a delusion-prone individual uses all information for 
inferential processes that he or she has available, but does not put effort in collecting more 
information and, importantly, testing the delusional hypothesis.  
In our behavioral experiment, the amount of information was very easy to manipulate, reducing 
and enlarging the size of the visible section of the lakes. In clinical practice, perception might 
play a critical role in manipulating the amount of certain information, e.g., being more or less 
sensitive to certain stimuli. In a clinical scenario, a preoccupied patient might screen for 
information confirming his delusional ideas and gather information allowing a higher certainty 
level than for information that supports an alternative hypothesis. 
In the experiment, the prediction of the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) could 
not be measured for abstract material; neither delusional nor non-delusional participants 
diagnosed with schizophrenia displayed lower flexibility to change their hypotheses in the face 
of disconfirmatory evidence. 
Task 2 and Task 5 were designed to test whether or not delusional and non-delusional 
schizophrenia patients would less readily change their opinion in the face of changing evidence. 
The ratios of fish in the lakes changed and as such the likelihoods were expected to be estimated 
differently. In contrast to the hypothesis, statistical testing did not reveal significant group 
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differences in the change of probability ratings. The finding of a Bias against Disconfirmatory 
Evidence (Woodward et al., 2006; Woodward et al., 2007) could not be replicated with more 
neutral material and the present sample. 
One potential explanation might be that BADE only applies to material with scenic content and 
does not represent a flaw in pure probabilistic reasoning, and that the findings with the Thematic 
Apperception Task are due to a different mechanism. However, several shortcomings in the 
methodology might have lead to the negative finding. First, the sample size has to be considered 
rather small. Only 15 delusional and 23 non-delusional patients with schizophrenia were 
recruited, which might be a too small a sample size to pick up the effect that was observed in the 
study of Woodward et al. (2006) where 52 patients with schizophrenia were recruited and where 
the healthy group changed their initial ratings more than twice as much as deluded patients did. 
Future studies that aim to investigate a BADE effect in schizophrenia might recruit larger and 
statistically more powerful samples. 
Second, several aspects of Bayesian reasoning were not reflected in the design which may have 
prohibited a BADE effect. To begin with, in both Task 2 and Task 5, the starting point for the 
variable lake was a ratio of 50%:50%, which actually did result in participants not being 
committed to the hypothesis that fish did or did not come from the lake, and presumably left 
participants in an indecisive state. The ratios were then manipulated, stepwise, in one direction, 
from the first to the fourth fish (e.g. down to a 20%:80 ratio in Task 2), giving growing evidence 
for one hypothesis. In the remaining six steps (from fish 5 to fish 10), evidence was gradually 
changed to the opposite hypothesis. Neither in the first part (from fish 1 to fish 4) nor in the 
second part (fish 4 to fish 10) did participants make ratings as extreme as in the other tasks with 
the same ratios. Furthermore, having only small visible sections of the lake might have provoked 
a cautious behavior which is reflected in the relatively small change in mean probability ratings 
in Task 2. This may also be the effect of a smaller amount of available information, as described 
above. 
Moreover, with the present methodology, the four fish in the beginning of the task tended to 
confirm the initial hypothesis (H1). Hereafter, the ratios were stepwise manipulated in the 
direction of the opposite hypothesis (H2). However, following the Bayesian model, fish 5 and 6 
also provided confirming evidence since the ratio still suggested the hypothesis that the 
participants would be committed to, reflected in the more extreme ratings in the Bayesian 
prediction (see Figure 5 and Figure 6), but also in the relative rigidity in the control groups. Only 
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the last three fish can be interpreted as disconfirmatory information and might not be enough 
evidence to observe a significant between-group effect. 
Regarding differences between the Bayesian model and actual ratings, the pure Bayesian model 
and its application in this experiment might be imprecise in representing a good model for 
inferential reasoning processes. Other aspects of reasoning might be taken into account in future. 
For example, the extent of information (in our example the size of the visible section of the lake) 
must be adequately represented in the model as a factor of new information. Also, this factor 
should be considered in light of the ‘prior odds’. In other words, it is not only pure information 
that should be regarded, but also the importance of new information in relation to ‘prior odds’. 
To test the hypothesis of BADE in this neutral scenario, future studies might use a design where 
participants are presented with a relatively strong hypothesis in the beginning and then 
confronted with disconfirming information, eventually in bigger steps (with one picture in the 
task employed by Woodward et al. (2006) the interpretation changed generally and not 
gradually). As mentioned above, larger samples should be collected. 
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4 Experiment 3 
4.1 Introduction 
Delusions are associated with the well documented ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) reasoning 
bias (Huq et al., 1988; Garety & Wesseley, 1991; Garety & Freeman, 1999; Fine et al., 2007). 
Delusions are an important, but not mandatory symptom for the diagnosis schizophrenia and, 
thus, samples tested for JTC type reasoning biases often consist of both delusional and non-
delusional patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (Garety & Freeman, 1999). Besides more 
prominent symptoms such as delusions, schizophrenia is also characterized by deficits of 
executive function, memory and attention (e. g. Weickert et al., 2000) that might lead to jumping-
to-conclusions response patterns on probabilistic reasoning tasks (Menon et al., 2006) and 
possibly confound the association of delusions with JTC. If reasoning biases are explicable by 
cognitive impairments in schizophrenia, JTC might be conceptualized as a trait-like feature of 
schizophrenia and not represent a state-marker of delusions. 
In a recent longitudinal study, a JTC pattern in patients with schizophrenia (but also 
schizoaffective and bipolar disorder) was stable over time despite improving delusional 
symptomatology (Peters & Garety, 2005). In previous studies that tested schizophrenia patients 
with varying delusion scores, task performance was not correlated with delusion scores (e.g. 
Mortimer et al., 1996; Dudley et al., 1997; Moritz & Woodward, 2005) or dependent on 
methodological manipulations that interfere with schizophrenia associated deficits, such as 
working memory deficits (Menon et al., 2006). However, a meta-analysis of several independent 
studies employing variations of the beads task revealed that JTC is associated with delusions, but 
the impact of impaired cognitive functions in schizophrenia remained unclear (Fine et al., 2007). 
Another approach that might provide clarification on the trait-vs.-state question is the testing of 
delusional individuals with no diagnoses of schizophrenia, since cognitive impairments 
contingent on schizophrenia can be ruled out. Non-schizophrenic individuals with delusional 
disorder have proven to perform no differently than delusional individuals with schizophrenia 
(Garety et al. 1991), but, on the other hand, there were also no differences between the delusional 
disorder group and psychiatric and non-psychiatric control groups. 
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Recently, van Dael et al. (2006) observed a 'dose-response relationship' between psychosis-
liability level and task performance in an at-risk population and an even stronger relationship in 
currently deluded individuals, arguing for both a trait-like and a state-like character of 
probabilistic reasoning biases in schizophrenia. 
Also, another longitudinal approach revealed probabilistic reasoning deviations in the deluded 
group which were not observed in remission (Brankovic & Braunovic, 1999), suggesting that 
certain reasoning deviations are state-markers. Notably, this study did not include explicit JTC 
measures. 
In Experiment 1, delusional subjects were more hasty in their decisions than all other control 
groups (non-delusional individuals diagnosed for schizophrenia, psychiatric and healthy 
controls), suggesting that JTC is an effect of delusions and not significantly affected by the 
cognitive deficits of schizophrenia or general psychiatric liability and gives strong evidence that 
JTC may be a state-like feature of delusions. However, a longitudinal observation of delusional 
individuals might more accurately address the state-vs.-trait debate. As such, we included a sub-
sample of psychiatric patients who changed in delusion scores from a longitudinal treatment 
study (Lecomte et al., 2008). In line with studies with the most consistent findings previously, we 
employed a variation of the beads task with a 'draws-to-decision procedure’ (Garety & Freeman, 
1999), using fish and lakes (see Experiment 1) instead of beads and containers.  
A correlation of changes in delusion scores with changes in task performance would provide 
strong additional evidence for JTC as a state-like feature of schizophrenia, representing an 
integral factor in the formation of delusions. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
We used a sub-sample from a longitudinal treatment study (Lecomte et al., 2008), comprising 19 
patients with changes in delusion scores. All patients were aged between 18 and 35 years, fluent 
(verbally as well as reading and writing skills) in one of the official languages of Canada 
(English and French), currently presenting with persistent or fluctuating psychotic symptoms 
(defined as delusions or hallucinations appearing occasionally, such as in periods of stress), 
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having consulted a mental health professional for psychotic symptoms (for the first time) during 
the last 2 years, and being treated by a psychiatrist and receiving antipsychotic medication. 
Individuals were only recruited once they had been discharged from the hospital and were 
considered ‘stabilized’ by their psychiatrist. Patients with an organic disorder or a previous 
intervention were not included. 
Fourteen patients had an established DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) diagnosis of schizophrenia 
(paranoid: n=13, undifferentiated: n=1). One participant was diagnosed with schizoaffective 
disorder, and another was diagnosed with dysthymic disorder. The remaining three psychiatric 
patients were diagnosed for substance abuse (cannabis: n = 1, stimulants: n = 2). All diagnoses 
were obtained from experienced psychiatrists according to DSM-IV-TR criteria. 
Eleven psychiatric patients were treated with Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT, 
schizophrenia: n = 7, schizoaffective: n = 1, stimulant abuse: n = 1, dysthymic disorder: n = 1), 
and four patients completed Symptom Management Training (SM, schizophrenia: n = 2, cannabis 
dependence: n = 1, stimulant abuse: n = 1). Four schizophrenia patients were not treated with 
either of the above interventions. Four patients in the CBT group and one patient in the SM 
group failed to complete the respective therapy. 
An overview of demographic information is given in Table 7. 
Age(M±SD) at baseline 24.53 (6.04) 
Gender (female/male) (3/16) 
Illness duration/years 2.69 (4.59) 
Years of school education 12.95 (1.65) 
BPRS baseline 45.16 (12.71) 
BPRS after treatment 36.78 (8.67) 
Table 9: sociodemographic and psychopathological characteristics of the sample. Mean values 
are accompanied by standard deviations (in brackets). 
In order to estimate symptom severity, all participants underwent a short interview and were 
assessed by the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS, Ventura et al., 1993) at both baseline 
(Time 1) and the second testing session (Time 2). The BPRS is an easily applicable psychiatric 
4 Experiment 3 
Page 47 
rating scale that consists of 24 symptom constructs, each ranging from 1 (‘not present’) to 7 
(‘extremely severe’). 
Delusion scores were assessed by means of a computation of BPRS 8 (‘grandiosity’), BPRS 9 
(‘suspiciousness’) and BPRS 11 (‘unusual thought content’). Fifteen participants improved from 
time 1 to time 2 (M = -1.689, SD = 1.012), four patients displayed higher delusion scores at time 
2 (M = 0.917, SD = 0.31). Furthermore, six individuals displayed decreases in hallucinations 
(BPRS item 10; Time 1 M = 4.67, Time 2 M = 1.67) and 4 displayed increases (Time 1 M = 
2.00, Time 2 M = 4.75), 7 displayed decreases in depression (BPRS item 3; Time 1 M = 3.57, 
Time 2 M = 1.57) and 3 displayed increases (Time 1 M = 2.00, Time 2 M = 3.67), and 2 
displayed decreases in thought disorder (BPRS item 15; Time 1 M = 3.00, Time 2 M = 1.00). 
4.2.2 Experiment 
A longitudinal study was conducted, employing the same task before (Time 1) and after (Time 2) 
the treatment intervention. The task was administered as part of a longitudinal psychiatric 
treatment study (Lecomte et al., 2008). The mean duration of treatment was M = 141 days (SD = 
46d). The minimum duration was 12 weeks. 
Materials 
In order to elicit a JTC pattern, a variation of the ‘beads task’ (Huq et al., 1988) was employed, 
using a ‘draws-to-decision’ procedure (Dudley et al., 1997a/b; Fear & Healy, 1997; Moritz & 
Woodward, 2005; Peters & Garety, 2006). As for Experiment 1, fish and lakes were employed.  
A total of four tasks were administered. In all tasks, the proportions were 60%/40% black and 
white fish respectively and the opposite ratio in the other lake. The lake on the left was labeled 
'Lake A', and the lake on the right was labeled 'Lake B'. One by one, a series of fish was ‘caught’ 
by a fisherman. The participants were instructed that the fisherman would always fish from the 
same lake, and that after each catch, the fish would be put back into the lake so that the 
proportions of fish did not change across the task. Task comprehension was checked by control 
questions. After each catch, participants were asked by the experimenter whether they had come 
to a decision or would like to see another fish (“Do you want to see more fish or have you 
decided?”). As soon as the participant made a decision, the task was terminated. 
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Task 1 and 2 were designed to test for JTC in situations with varying working memory load. In 
Task 1, the ratios of fish in the lakes were explicitly mentioned by the experimenter in order to 
rule out a high memory load. In Task 2, the ratio was not mentioned explicitly, representing a 
high WM condition. In Task 3 and 4, there was a monetary reward for correct responses in order 
to introduce a motivational component. In Task 3, participants were rewarded $0.25 for a correct 
response, independent of the number of fish they required. In Task 4, the amount of money was 
increased to $5. 
In Task 1 and Task 3, Lake A contained more black fish. In Task 2 and Task 4, Lake A contained 
more white fish. 
Sequence of Fish 
The four tasks presented fish in the following order (B = black, W = white): 
Task 1: B-B-W-B-W-W-B-W-B-B 
Task 2: W-W-B-W-B-B-W-W-B-W 
Task 3: B-B-W-B-W-B-W-B-W-B 
Task 4: W-W-B-W-B-W-W-W-B-B  
These sequences are more ambiguous than in previous studies using a ‘draws to decision' 
procedure (Moritz & Woodward, 2004; Huq et al., 1988) and than the sequences in Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2. As such, participants were expected to request more beads overall and that 
this would allow a more sensitive measure of changes in the requested number of beads. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Change in Delusion Scores 
Delusion scores were assessed by means of BPRS 8 (‘grandiosity’), BPRS 9 (‘suspiciousness’) 
and BPRS 11 (‘unusual thought content’). For our sample, the mean delusion score (average over 
BPRS 8, 9 and 11) was M = 3.35 (SD=1.39) at baseline and M = 2.21 (SD = 1.27) after the 
treatment courses, reflecting a significant improvement in delusional scores (p < 0.01). However, 
there were four patients that displayed higher delusion scores at time 2. 
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4.3.2 Change in Requested Beads (JTC) 
The mean number of requested fish is presented in Table 10.  
A 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted with session (Time 1 and Time 2) and task (Task 1, 2, 3, 4) as 
within-subject factors. There was a Session effect (F(1,18) = 5.79; p < 0.05), but no effect of 
Task (F(5,51) = 0.83; p = 0.48) or Session by Task interaction (F(3,54) = 0.57; p = 0.64).   
Task Time 1 
Mean(SD) 
Time 2 
Mean(SD) 
Sig. 
Task 1: lower 
cognitive load 
7.32 5.89 p < 0.05 
Task 2: higher 
cognitive load 
7.11 5.74 p < 0.10 
Task 3: $0.25 reward 
for correct answer 
6.84 5.58 p < 0.05 
Task 4: $5.00 reward 
for correct answer 
6.74 5.74 p < 0.10 
Table 10: Change in number of requested fish from Time 1 to Time 2 
4.3.3 Correlation of Delusion Scores With Task Performance 
In order to address the state-vs.-trait question of JTC in delusions, Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients were employed to asses the correspondence between changes in delusions scores and 
changes in the number of requested fish. Table 8 displays an overview over correlation analyses. 
There were significant negative correlations of the change in delusion severity with task 
performance for Task 1 and Task 4. To illustrate, improvement on the delusions scale was 
associated with more requested draws until a decision was reached and vice versa. In Task 2 and 
3, changes in delusions scores were also negatively correlated with requested beads, but did not 
reach a statistically significant level. Closer consideration revealed that patients with higher 
delusion scores at Time 2 requested fewer draws (e.g. in Task 1, the mean change in draws to 
decision was M = -0.375, SD = ±4.5) than patients who improved on delusions (for Task 1, the 
mean was also negative, M = -.08, SD = ±1.9 indicating less draws to decision overall). 
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 Spearman's correlation 
Task 1: lower cognitive load -.484* 
Sig. (2-tailed) p < 0.05 
Task 2: higher cognitive load -.354 
Sig. (2-tailed) p = 0.1; p = 0.06 (1-tailed) 
Task 3: $0.25 reward for correct answer -.357 
Sig. (2-tailed) p = 0.1; p = 0.06 (1-tailed) 
Task 4: $5.00 reward for correct answer -.550* 
Sig. (2-tailed P < 0.05; p < 0.01 (1-tailed) 
Table 11: Spearman Correlation of change in delusion scores (BPRS 8, 9 & 11) and Task 
performance. * = significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
20.0015.0010.005.000.00
Ranked change in delusions scores
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
R
a
n
ke
d 
ch
an
ge
 
in
 
ta
sk
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
Figure 9: Ranked scatter Plot, Task 1 
4 Experiment 3 
Page 51 
20.0015.0010.005.000.00
Ranked change in delusion scores
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
R
an
ke
d 
ch
an
ge
 
in
 
ta
sk
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
Figure 10: Ranked scatter Plot, Task 4 
4.4 Discussion 
The results indicate a negative correlation of task performance (requested beads) and 
development of delusion scores over time. So, the hypothesis of a state-like reasoning bias of 
JTC was confirmed. To illustrate, if patients improved in delusion scores over time, this was 
associated with a tendency to request more draws to a decision and vice versa. The correlation 
was significant for the memory assisted version (Task 1) and for the $5-bet condition (Task 4). In 
the remaining two conditions, the correlation did not reach statistical significance but displayed 
the same directionality. While the JTC bias has previously been shown to be counteracted by 
higher working memory demands and influenced by motivational manipulations (Menon et al., 
2006), our manipulations might have been too weak to have a measurable impact on task 
performance. 
In Experiment 1, low delusion scores were not associated with JTC while individuals with high 
delusion scores displayed a JTC bias. In this experiment the relationship of delusion scores with 
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task performance was revealed in the same individuals at two different points in time with 
different symptom severity. This provides further evidence for a state-like character of the JTC 
reasoning style. 
The present study supports other studies that observed a JTC bias independent of the impact of 
the cognitive impairments associated with schizophrenia and other psychiatric diseases (Van 
Dael et al., 2006, Moritz & Woodward, 2005), and extents those findings by indicating its 
longitudinal design. In contrast to our findings, a similar longitudinal study, Peters and Garety 
(2005) found no change in response style using a 'draws to decision' measure with previously 
deluded patients with schizophrenia in remission. In this study, only patients who improved in 
delusion scores were included, while in our sample, patients with increasing delusional severity 
displayed a larger decrease in requested fish than improving patients, who showed an increase in 
requested fish. This might be due to a ‘practice effect’, which was also reported in the study of 
Peters & Garety (2005). The finding that delusional patients differed from all control groups at 
baseline and were equal with all control groups in remission might also be interpreted as a 
diminished JTC effect at the second testing time: relative to the control groups, delusional 
patients requested more fish in remission compared to in the acutely delusional stage.  
Some limitations of the present study must be acknowledged. First, the study must be regarded 
as a pilot study due to the small sample size. Second, the sample was not randomized for 
treatment strategies, so specific treatment effects of CBT or SM could not be ruled out. Third, a 
potential practice further limits the power of the actual finding. Finally, the design of the present 
paradigm did not allow a clear demonstration of the JTC bias.  
Further studies might aim for larger sample sizes for both non-schizophrenia and schizophrenia 
groups, match for treatment (e.g., CBT) and demographic parameters, measure multiple 
reasoning abnormalities in the delusional and a non-delusional stage, record hypothesized 
cognitive deficits associated with schizophrenia (working memory deficits, attention deficits) 
and evaluate the effect of reasoning abnormalities in delusions in a multivariate approach. 
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5 General Discussion and Conclusion 
Starting with the influential work of Jaspers (1913), there was a strong phenomenological line of 
research in the field of psychosis and delusions in Germany. In contrast to neurotic symptoms, 
delusions as a core psychotic symptom were conceptualized to be un-understandable 
phenomena, based upon an unidentifiable somatic ‘process’. The concepts of succeeding 
psychiatrists at the prominent Heidelberg University Psychiatric Clinic, e.g. Kurt Schneider and 
Walter von Baeyer, claimed that delusions arise from basically disturbed psychological 
processes, leading to the separation of psychotherapy from the treatment of psychosis. On the 
other hand, psychodynamic approaches, following the tradition of Sigmund Freud, have 
underlined the role of psychotherapeutic interventions in psychotic disorders. 
With its beginning in Great Britain in the 1980s, a cognitive-neuropsychiatric research branch 
evolved, developing concrete and testable models of the formation and maintenance of 
delusions, and offered potential explanations of delusions complementary to the influential ideas 
of German phenomenologists and the psychodynamic conceptualizations of the 20th century. 
Several cognitive biases are reported in psychotic disorders with delusions. Besides deviances in 
attributional style (Bentall et al., 1994), theory of mind deficits (Frith & Corcoran, 1996) and low 
self-esteem (Bentall et al., 2001), there is consistent evidence for deviations in probabilistic 
reasoning (Moritz & Woodward, 2005), resulting in a data gathering bias (Freeman, 2007). These 
biases are thought to underpin the emergence and the maintenance of the disorders, particularly 
delusions (Bell et al., 2006). 
The present thesis investigates a range of probabilistic reasoning biases and their potential 
relationship to one another. A new paradigm was introduced, using a graded estimates procedure 
instead of the draws-to-decision procedure that has been predominantly employed in previous 
studies (Garety & Freeman, 1999). In Experiment 1, using a ‘graded-estimates’ procedure, a 
tendency of deluded patients to jump to conclusions (JTC) was found for highly probable 
response options. Distinguishing between high and low probability options is not possible with a 
draws-to-decision design, so the graded estimates procedure might represent a new resource for 
the investigation of cognitive systems underlying delusions. In line with previous findings, a 
liberal acceptance (LA) account was supported as patients with high delusion scores more 
readily accepted low probability response options. However, data analysis revealed that both 
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phenomena are associated with delusions, but do not share common underpinnings, at least not 
in this sample that has limited statistical power. The manipulation of ambiguity in Experiment 2, 
with smaller sections of the lakes visible, revealed another interesting aspect of the JTC bias in 
this ‘graded-estimates’ procedure paradigm: JTC-type probability ratings require low ambiguity. 
As such, the tendency towards hasty decisions appears to depend on a subjective feeling of 
certainty. 
Experiment 2 was designed to test the hypothesis of a Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence 
(BADE) with neutral task material. Unlike the previously employed scenic paradigm, where the 
second piece of information completely changed the basic interpretation of the comic strip series 
(Woodward et al., 2006), the material in this experiment was abstract. Also, contrary evidence 
was given gradually and stepwise, and the first catches after the most extreme ratio distribution 
(fish 4) also confirmed the initial hypothesis. Only for the very last catches was there any 
‘disconfirming’ evidence. This paradigm failed to demonstrate a BADE with this neutral task 
material. One potential explanation is that BADE applies to scenic content, exclusively. 
Alternatively, a different ratio-distribution among the lakes with clear disconfirming evidence 
earlier in the task might represent a better method to investigate BADE in neutral task material. 
Experiment 3 provides strong support that the JTC decision-making style is a state-like feature of 
delusions, independent of other cognitive impairments. Despite the small sample size and certain 
methodological shortcomings (see discussion, Experiment 3), this is the first study with a 
longitudinal design that displays an association of delusional ideation with JTC. So, the JTC 
reasoning style is not confounded by varying cognitive impairments in different subjects, as the 
longitudinal design provides intra-individual comparisons. 
In summary, patients with delusions, whether they are diagnosed with schizophrenia or other 
psychotic disorders with delusions, display abnormalities in probabilistic reasoning that might 
contribute both to the formation and maintenance of delusions. The close correlation of these 
abnormalities with delusional scores demonstrates that it is not general cognitive impairments, 
but specific cognitive alterations in reasoning and decision-making processes that may contribute 
to the emergence and maintenance of delusions. Regarding probabilistic reasoning biases in 
general, effects sizes are rather small, and studies with larger samples are needed to allow a more 
accurate examination of the extent to which single reasoning biases interfere with each other. 
Additionally, larger samples will provide more statistical power for multivariate analysis.  
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As stated previously, probabilistic reasoning abnormalities are among other factors that form an 
integrative model of delusions (Freeman, 2007). While JTC and LA may play a facilitatory role 
in the formation of new delusional systems, BADE might contribute to the maintenance of 
already present delusional ideas. The more accurate characterization of neuropsychiatric 
phenomena and the investigation of their neural underpinnings might ultimately provide 
implications for biological and psychotherapeutic treatment. 
In the past, psychotic episodes and positive symptoms of schizophrenia were categorized as 
endogenous and thus not treatable with psychotherapy (Walker, 1991). Instead, there was a 
predominance of psychopharmacological treatment. However, in the last decade, there have been 
attempts to treat psychosis with Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT, Terrier & Wykes, 2004; 
Gaudiano, 2006). Still, use of CBT for psychosis is an exception rather than clinical routine and 
the efficacy of psychological interventions in psychotic symptoms is unclear. 
Recently, a Metacognitive Training concept (MCT) has been proposed (Moritz & Woodward, 
2007a) which is based on the presence of reasoning deviations and other cognitive characteristics 
in psychosis. MCT is a program designed for psychosis patients that attempts to transfer 
knowledge about basic cognitive alterations into clinical practice. It comprises several reasoning 
biases, namely (1) self-serving bias and depressive attributional style, (2) JTC, (3) BADE, (4) 
theory of mind deficits, (5) Need for Closure (NFC), (6) Liberal Acceptance (LA) and (7) mood 
and self-esteem. 
MCT is employed in the frame of a psychotherapeutic group intervention comprised of eight 
sessions or modules. In single sessions, patients are supposed to first learn about current research 
findings by means of psychoeducation. Once patients are familiar with the target domain (e. g. 
JTC or theory-of-mind errors) and the significance for the clinical manifestations of psychosis in 
the patients’ lives is explained, several exercises that aim to correct those biases are 
administered.  Although patients are encouraged to vivify the sessions with examples from their 
own symptoms, the individual and personal psychotherapeutic treatment is not part of MCT, but 
should be restricted to therapeutic one-to-one sessions. 
The preliminary results of MCT programs in patients with schizophrenia are promising. Thus, 
MCT possibly represents a useful part in multimodal treatment programs of schizophrenia and 
other psychotic disorders. However, the long-term effects of MCT have not yet been investigated 
(Moritz & Woodward, 2007a). 
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To conclude, the current thesis contributes to the characterization of reasoning abnormalities 
associated with delusions, and these abnormalities may be counteracted by psychotherapeutic 
interventions, e.g. using the aforementioned treatment program MCT. Additionally, the 
investigation of the underlying neural mechanisms of the described reasoning abnormalities 
might improve psychopharmacological interventions. However, these findings and putative 
treatment options only address parts of the complex nature of psychotic illnesses such as 
schizophrenia. Psychotic illnesses are disabling disease entities with a chronic illness course, 
starting with subtle impairment, eventually resulting in chronic clinical deterioration (Lieberman, 
1999) and ultimately leading to diminished social and functional capacity.  Current research on 
reasoning abnormalities in psychosis, including the present three experiments, represents only a 
small step towards improving treatment for patients who suffer from schizophrenia and related 
illnesses. 
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6 Zusammenfassung 
Wahnhafte Überzeugungen gehören zu den häufigsten und prominentesten Symptomen einer 
Person mit einer schizophrenen Psychose, insbesondere bei Vorliegen des paranoiden Subtypus. 
Daneben wird Wahnsymptomatik z.B. bei schizoaffektiven Erkrankungen und affektiven 
Psychosen, aber auch bei Substanz-bezogenen Störungen oder im Rahmen neurologischer 
Erkrankungen beobachtet.  
Die Ätiologie wahnhafter Symptomatik rief in der Geschichte großes Interesse bei Klinikern und 
Wissenschaftlern hervor. Dabei beeinflusste Jaspers Theorie des Wahns in der Allgemeinen 
Psychopathologie (Jaspers, 1913) die internationale Wahnforschung nachhaltig. Jaspers ging 
davon aus, dass Wahn auf „physisch-psychotische Hirnprozesse“ zurückginge, die ein 
ungerichtetes „sinnloses Durcheinander“ psychischer Funktionen verursachten. Auch andere 
einflussreiche deutschsprachige Psychiater, darunter Kurt Schneider und Walter von Baeyer, 
vermuteten eine biologisch verwurzelte generelle Störung psychischer Funktionen als Ursache 
von Wahnphänomenen, die einer logischen Systematik entbehrten und somit 
psychotherapeutisch nicht zugänglich seien. In Ergänzung dazu existierten psychodynamische 
Konzepte, Sigmund Freud z.B. sah in wahnhafter Symptomatik einen Abwehrmechanismus 
gegen homosexuelle Triebe. 
Ausgehend von Großbritannien ist seit den 80-iger Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhunderts Wahn 
mit Methoden der kognitiven Neuropsychologie untersucht worden. Dabei sind eine Reihe von 
konkreten und testbaren Einzelmodellen (s.u.) entwickelt worden, die bei der Entstehung und 
Aufrechterhaltung von Wahnsymptomatik eine Rolle spielen könnten.  
Dazu zählen Besonderheiten im schlussfolgernden Denken von wahnhaften Patienten, 
insbesondere bei Vorliegen der Diagnose Schizophrenie. Das Standard-Paradigma, um solche 
Abweichungen zu untersuchen, ist eine probabilistische Entscheidungsaufgabe, das so genannte 
Kugel-Paradigma (’beads task’, Huq et al., 1988). Am häufigsten und besten ist die Neigung zu 
voreiligen Entscheidungen ('Jumping-to-conculsions'; JTC) bei wahnhaften Patienten gezeigt, 
und wird übereinstimmend als zu geringe Informationssammlung bei Entscheidungsfindungen 
interpretiert. Neben dieser viel verwendeten Aufgabenvariante, bei der das individuelle Ausmaß 
an Informationssammlung gemessen wird ('draws-to-decision’ procedure), wurde das Paradigma 
unter anderem so variiert, dass für jeden Schritt Entscheidungswahrscheinlichkeiten registriert 
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werden können ('graded-estimates’ procedure). So ist es möglich zu untersuchen, ob sich 
voreilige Entscheidungen auf Unterschiede in der Einschätzung von Wahrscheinlichkeiten 
zurückführen lassen. Dies führte zu der Formulierung einer zweiten Abweichung im 
schlussfolgernden Denken bei wahnhaften Patienten: der Liberal Acceptance Bias (LA, Moritz & 
Woodward, 2004). Dieses Modell besagt, dass wahnhafte Patienten tendenziell weniger 
wahrscheinliche Antwortalternativen eher als möglich ansehen als gesunde Probanden. 
Eine weitere Aufgabenvariante, in der Bilder verwendet wurden, deren inhaltliche Bedeutung 
sich schrittweise mit der Zugabe weiterer Bilder änderte, diente der Erfassung der geringeren 
Änderungsbereitschaft nach einer bereits getroffenen Entscheidung bei Patienten mit Wahn, und 
führte zur Formulierung der 'Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence’ (BADE, Woodward et al., 
2006). 
All diese Einzelmodelle erfassen Besonderheiten des Denkens von wahnhaften Patienten im 
Sinne des Bayes-Theorems von bedingten Wahrscheinlichkeiten, auch 'Umkehrinduktion' 
genannt, ein gängiges mathematisches Modell im Bereich von Entscheidungen bei Unsicherheit 
('Reasoning under uncertainty', Kahneman 2003). 
Es wird postuliert, dass die oben beschriebenen Auffälligkeiten im schlussfolgernden Denken 
wahnhafter Patienten zusammen mit weiteren kognitiven Auffälligkeiten (s.u.) eine Rolle bei der 
Ätiologie von Wahnsymptomen spielen, da sie die Wahrscheinlichkeit falscher Schlüsse erhöhen 
und folglich die Entstehung und Beibehaltung wahnhafter Überzeugungen begünstigen.  
In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden die bereits beschriebenen Auffälligkeiten bei wahnhaften 
Patienten und deren Verhältnis zueinander näher untersucht.  
In den ersten beiden Experimenten wurde ein neues Paradigma eingeführt. Ein Fischer, der 
zwischen zwei Seen steht, fängt schwarze oder weiße Fische. Der Proband soll anhand der 
Reihenfolge von gefangenen Fischen sowie dem Verhältnis von Fischen in den Seen entscheiden, 
aus welchem Seen der Fischer seine Fische fängt, wobei die Probanden so instruiert sind, dass 
alle Fische aus dem gleichen See stammen. Nach einem Fang würde er die Fische wieder in den 
See werfen, so dass sich an der absoluten Anzahl von Fischen nichts ändert. Nach jedem Fang 
wurden die Probanden aufgefordert, anhand einer Skala von 0 bis 10 für jeden See die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit anzugeben, dass der gefangene Fisch aus diesem stammt. Die Ratings waren 
unabhängig, mussten also z.B. nicht in der Summe 10 ergeben. Dies entspricht einer 'graded-
estimates procedure' mit unabhängigen Ratings. 
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Die simultane Erfassung der Ratings für hoch- und niedrigwahrscheinliche Antwortalternativen 
in Experiment 1 ermöglichte die gleichzeitige Untersuchung der Phänomene JTC und LA, mit 
dem Ziel, die Beziehung der beiden Phänomene untereinander zu verstehen. Es nahmen vier 
verschiedene Populationen an der Untersuchung Teil: Wahnhafte Patienten mit einer 
Schizophreniediagnose (DSM-IV-TR), Schizophrenie-Patienten ohne Wahnsymptome, 
psychiatrische Patienten ohne Schizophrenie (zum Großteil Bipolarstörung) sowie eine 
Kontrollpopulation ohne psychische Störungen. Dadurch sollte sichergestellt werden, dass die 
beobachteten Phänomene nicht mit anderen Voraussetzungen als Wahn zusammenhängen. 
In Experiment 1 wurde erwartet, dass Psychosepatienten mit aktueller Wahnsymptomatik bei 
hochwahrscheinlichen Antwortalternativen zu schnelleren Schlussfolgerungen (JTC, gemessen 
an Ratings > 9 nach dem ersten Fisch) kommen, während sie bei weniger wahrscheinlichen 
Antwortalternativen höhere Ratings als die übrigen  Probanden aufweisen (LA). 
Zum einen wurde die JTC - Hypothese bestätigt, und zwar spezifisch für Patienten mit 
Wahnsymptomen. Dies erweitert das Verständnis von JTC, da bezüglich der 
Entscheidungsgeschwindigkeit in früheren Studien zum Teil kein konsistenter Gruppeneffekt 
zwischen wahnhaften und nichtwahnhaften Psychosepatienten beobachtet wurde. Das hier 
erstmals angewendete Paradigma erwies sich als eine sensitive Möglichkeit, die JTC - Bias zu 
demonstrieren. 
Zum anderen konnte die LA - Bias ebenfalls beobachtet werden, wiederum ausschließlich bei 
wahnhaften Psychosepatienten, die Antwortmöglichkeiten mit geringen Wahrscheinlichkeiten 
konsistent eher für möglich hielten als die Vergleichsgruppen. 
Sowohl für JTC als auch für LA ergaben sich signifikante Gruppeneffekte beim Vergleich von 
aktuell wahnhaften Psychosepatienten und nicht-wahnhaften Patienten und Probanden. Diese 
Ergebnisse sprechen dafür, dass die Auffälligkeiten im Denken von Psychosepatienten als wahn-
spezifische State-Marker und keine generellen Trait-Marker von Psychoseerkrankungen zu 
verstehen sind. In der statistischen Auswertung ergab sich jedoch keine klare Korrelation der 
beiden Phänomene JTC und LA, so dass die beiden Phänomene voneinander unabhängige 
Besonderheiten in Denkprozessen psychotischer Patienten darstellen. 
Im Experiment 2 wurde die Hypothese der 'Bias Against Disconformatory Evidence' (BADE) in 
abstraktem Aufgabenmaterial getestet. Durch die schrittweise Vergrößerung des sichtbaren 
Segmentes eines Sees veränderte sich das Verhältnis von schwarzen und weißen Fischen. So 
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wurde die Entscheidungsgrundlage manipuliert und getestet, ob Probanden eher auf ihren 
anfangs gebildeten Hypothesen verharren oder ihre Überzeugungen auf Grundlage der 
Mehrinformationen verändern.  
Hier wurde erwartet, dass Psychosepatienten mit Wahn ihre Ratings nach den ersten Fischen 
gegenüber den Kontrollgruppen weniger stark verändern trotz des sich stetig verändernden 
Verhältnisses von schwarzen und weißen Fischen (BADE) durch vergrößerte Seesegmente. 
Außerdem wurde erwartet, dass sich wiederum nach dem ersten Fisch mit einer Farbverteilung 
analog zum Experiment 1 wahnhafte Patienten einen JTC-Effekt aufweisen (Ratings > 9). 
Bezüglich der Flexibilität, auf neue Informationen zu reagieren, wurden keine Gruppeneffekte 
beobachtet. Ein Grund könnte sein, dass BADE nur für szenisches Testmaterial gilt, nicht aber 
für ein abstraktes mathematische Paradigma. Daneben ist festzuhalten, dass in dem Paradigma in 
der Nachbetrachtung methodische Mängel auffielen. So wurde als Anfangsbedingung in einem 
See ein Verhältnis von Fischen von 50%/50% vorgegeben, was keine Antwortmöglichkeit 
begünstigte. In den folgenden Schritten wurde die Wahrscheinlichkeit zunächst in eine Richtung 
manipuliert und kehrte sich erst nach dem sechsten Schritt um. 'Disconfirmatory Evidence' im 
eigentlichen Sinne wurde lediglich in den letzten vier Schritten des Experiments administriert. 
Daneben ist die geringe Stichprobengröße zu erwähnen. Ebenfalls entgegen der ursprünglichen 
Hypothese fiel auf, dass JTC bei gleichen Farbverteilungen von Fischen wie im Experiment 1, 
jedoch kleineren See-Segmenten mit weniger Fischen, nicht vorhanden war. Somit scheint der 
JTC - Effekt darauf zu beruhen, dass bei wahnhaften Psychosepatienten die Antwortmöglichkeit 
sicher erscheinen sollte, um zu einer schnellen Entscheidung zu führen. Dies unterstützt die 
Hypothese der LA-Bias, die auch postuliert, dass der JTC-Effekt durch eine erhöhte Ambiguität 
abgeschwächt wird (Moritz et al., 2007). 
Bei der häufigen Replikation von JTC bei unterschiedlichen Stichproben, am deutlichsten aber 
bei Psychosepatienten mit aktueller Wahnsymptomatik, stellt sich die Frage, ob Auffälligkeiten 
im schlussfolgernden Denken aus der Gruppe von JTC bei Patienten mit wahnhaften Störungen 
einen generellen Risikofaktor darstellen, also so genannte Trait-Marker, zu denen auch generelle 
kognitive Beeinträchtigungen bei Psychosepatienten zählen, oder spezifische mit 
Wahnsymptomatik assoziierte Phänomene, so genannte State-Marker darstellen. 
Dafür wurde eine prospektive longitudinale Studie (Experiment 3) durchgeführt, bei der 
Psychosepatienten zu zwei unterschiedlichen Zeitpunkten mit jeweils unterschiedlich 
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ausgeprägter Wahnsymptomatik mit einem 'Beads-Task'-Paradigma untersucht wurden, 
allerdings mit einer 'draws-to-decision'-Variante.  
Es wurde erwartet, dass Patienten bei stärkerer Ausprägung von Wahnsymptomatik, gemessen an 
charakteristischen Items des BPRS (Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale), eine größere Neigung zu 
voreiligen Schlussfolgerungen (JTC) aufweisen. 
Tatsächlich korrelierte die Ausprägung der Wahnsymptomatik mit der Bereitschaft zu schnellen 
Entscheidungen, was eine Konzeptualisierung der Auffälligkeiten im Denken von 
Psychosepatienten als wahn-spezifischen State-Marker unterstützt. Die geringe Stichprobengröße 
limitiert die Aussagekraft dieser Studie. Dennoch ist diese Studie die bislang einzige, bei der JTC 
in longitudinalem Design als ein mit Wahn assoziiertes Phämonen dargestellt werden konnte. 
Insgesamt trägt die vorliegende Arbeit zum besseren Verständnis dieser als wahn-spezifisch zu 
verstehenden Auffälligkeiten im abstrakt-logischen schlussfolgernden Denken von 
Psychosepatienten bei.  
Neben Abweichungen in probabilistischen Entscheidungsparadigmen sind weitere kognitiv–
neuropsychologische Auffälligkeiten bei wahnhaften Patienten beschrieben, die sich als 
Einzelphänomene zu einem integrierten Modell zur Ausbildung und Aufrechterhaltung von 
Wahnsymptomatik zusammenführen lassen. So neigen wahnhafte Patienten dazu, Ursachen für 
positive Ereignisse internal und Ursachen für negative Ereignisse external zu attribuieren (Fear 
et al., 1997). Daneben verfügen wahnhafte Patienten über eine verminderte Fähigkeit, mentale 
Zustände anderer Personen zu repräsentieren (‚Theory of Mind’, Frith & Corcoran, 1996).  
Bezüglich der Abweichungen im schlussfolgernden Denken wurde eine Ambiguitätsintoleranz 
als Entstehungsmechanismus für voreilige Entscheidungen vermutet (Colbert & Peters, 2002). 
Undurchsichtige und widersprüchliche Situationen scheinen für wahnhafte Patienten mehr als für 
eine Normalpopulation unangenehm zu sein, so dass nach einer schnellen Interpretation gestrebt 
wird. Im Übrigen wurde postuliert, dass Wahnvorstellungen eine den Selbstwert schützende 
Funktion haben könnten (Bentall et al., 1994), wobei empirische Untersuchungen zu dieser 
Hypothese widersprüchlich sind, und somit die Schutzfunktion von Wahn in Bezug auf 
Selbstwertgefühl umstritten bleibt (Garety & Freeman, 1999). 
Unter Berücksichtigung dieser beschriebenen Einzelphänomene wäre die Entstehung von  
Wahnphänomenen wie folgt modellhaft vorstellbar: Bei ungewöhnlichen, bedrohlichen oder 
negativen Ereignissen (Stress) mag es durch den typischen Attributionsstil dazu kommen, dass 
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eine psychosekranke Person external anderen Personen die Ursache für diese Ereignisse 
zuschreibt, was die Entstehung (paranioder) wahnhafter Überzeugungen begünstigen würde. 
Eine Neigung zu voreiligen Schlussfolgerungen und Defizite in Theory-of-Mind Fähigkeiten 
erhöht die Wahrscheinlichkeit solcher Fehlattributionen um ein weiteres. Ebenfalls könnten die 
externalen Attributionen negativer Ereignisse protektive Wirkung für das Selbstwertgefühl 
bedeuten. Die Tendenz, weniger Information für eine Entscheidungsfindung zu sammeln und 
selektiv an sich primär aufdrängenden Hypothesen festzuhalten, mag die Wahnphänomene im 
Weiteren aufrechterhalten (Freeman, 2007). Dabei könnte die erniedrigte Akzeptanzschwelle 
(LA) dazu führen, dass eine oder mehrere nicht stimmige Hypothesen zur Erklärung des 
Stressors weiter in Betracht gezogen werden und sich ergänzen. 
Auf der Grundlage dieser ätiologisch bedeutsamen Einzelmodelle könnte in Zukunft versucht 
werden, Wahnsymptomen auf psychotherapeutischem Wege entgegen zu wirken. Hierzu gibt es 
bereits ein Therapieprogramm (Metakognitives Training, Moritz & Woodward, 2007a). Die 
Pilotstudien verliefen viel versprechend. Unter einem psychoedukativen und präventivem Ansatz 
lernen Patienten an plastischen Beispielen, wie beispielsweise voreilige Entscheidungen oder 
eine erniedrigte Akzeptanzschwelle das Entstehen einer Wahnidee begünstigen. Damit 
verbunden ist die Hoffnung, dass Patienten bei einem eventuellen weiteren Schub und sich 
entwickelnden Wahnideen kritischer sind und gebildete Hypothesen über die Umwelt mehr 
hinterfragen. Während diese Intervention von Psychose-Patienten im Intervall gut angenommen 
wurde, ist für Patienten im akuten Schub diese Therapieform sicherlich keine Option. 
Die Beeinflussbarkeit der neurokognitiven Auffälligkeiten durch Neuroleptika wurde bisher 
nicht systematisch untersucht. Erste Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass z.B. JTC durch Neuroleptika 
nicht beeinflussbar ist, jedoch die Wirkung von Neuroleptika auf psychotische Symptomatik 
voraussagen kann (So et al., 2010). 
Eine Verbindung der Verhaltensexperimente mit bildgebenden oder neurophysiologischen 
Methoden könnte zum besseren neuronalen Verständnis von Wahnsymptomatik führen und somit 
die biologische bzw. pharmakologische Behandlung von Psychosekrankheiten, die immer noch 
mit enormem Krankheitswert verbunden sind, optimieren.
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Appendix 
Instructions for Experiment 1 (Part I) and Experiment 2 (Part II)  
 
Experimenter: You will see a little fisherman fishing in two lakes (Lake A or Lake B). The 
first fish that he catches decides which lake he will fish from for the remainder of the day (in 
other words, he is going to be fishing from one lake the whole time).  He is fishing for black 
or white fish.  This fisherman fishes as a hobby rather than fishing for food.  That means 
every time he catches a fish he puts it back into the very same lake that he originally 
caught if from, so that the total number of fish in each lake never changes, no matter how 
many fish he catches. 
 
Part I 
In the first part of the study, you will see a full and complete view of both lakes.  Then you 
will see each fish as it is caught one at a time.  After each fish is caught, you will be asked 
to rate on a scale from 0 to 10, the probability that the man is fishing from Lake A and Lake 
B the whole time.  In other words, both lake A and B will have their own scale or scroll bar 
similar to the following: 
 
0     10   
highly unlikely unlikely possible      likely   highly likely 
 
You may rate the probability as high or as low as you believe it to be, and you may even 
have the same probabilities for both lakes. 
 
After each fish is pulled you will be asked to change your ratings accordingly, however you 
may keep the ratings for both lakes or even one of the lakes the same if you believe that 
the probability has not changed. 
 
Any questions? 
 
Note: At this point begin Part I before giving instructions for Part II. 
 
Part II 
Experimenter: Part II is similar to Part I, but this time instead of a complete view of the 
lakes you will be given a partial view, where you will only see a piece of the lake with only a 
few of the fish in the lake.   
 
However the task is the same as Part I.  A fish will be caught from the lake, and you will be 
asked to rate the probability that is from Lake A and the probability that it is from Lake B.  
However, as each fish is drawn, you will be shown a larger piece of the lake, so that you can 
change your ratings accordingly, or you may even keep them the same.  The lake will be 
revealed to you in 10 pieces, until you see the view of the whole lake at the very end.   
 
Important: Please don’t try to guess what is in the whole lake, but instead, make your 
ratings based on what you see. 
 
Any questions? 
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Thesen 
Jumping to Conclusions, Liberal Acceptance and the Bias Against Disconfirmatory 
Evidence: An Evaluation of Reasoning Biases in Delusions 
Hintergrund: Der Wahn ist ein häufiges und prominentes Symptom bei einer Reihe von 
psychiatrischen Erkrankungen, insbesondere bei schizophrenen Psychosen. Seit den 80iger-
Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts wird wahnhafte Symptomatik mit den Methoden kognitiver 
Neuropsychologie untersucht, wobei bei akut wahnhaften Psychosepatienten neben z.B. Theory-
of-Mind Defiziten, einem charakteristischen Attributionsstil und Störungen der attentionalen 
Verarbeitung auch eine Neigung zu voreiligen Schlussfolgerungen beobachtet wurde, die hier 
näher untersucht wurde. 
Experiment 1: In einem neu eingeführten Entscheidungs-Paradigma, bei welchem Probanden 
anhand des Verhältnisses von schwarzen und weißen Fischen in zwei Seen raten sollten, aus 
welchem der Seen ein gerade gefangener schwarzer oder weißer Fisch stammt, neigten 
ausschließlich wahnhafte Patienten zu voreiligem Entscheidungen („Jumping-to-Conclusions“, 
JTC) und schlossen wenig wahrscheinliche Antwortmöglichkeiten gegenüber allen 
Kontrollgruppen bevorzugt ein („Liberal Acceptance, LA“), wobei die beiden Phänomene keine 
Korrelation aufwiesen. 
Experiment 2: Die für szenisches Bildmaterial beschriebene Unkorrigierbarkeit getroffener 
Entscheidungen („Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence“, BADE) wurde mit abstraktem 
Testmaterial untersucht, wobei kein Unterschied im Antwortverhalten der Untersuchungsgruppen 
auftrat. Bei initial weniger Fischen pro See, jedoch bei gleichen Grundwahrscheinlichkeiten wie 
in Experiment 1 war eine Neigung zu voreiligen Entscheidungen (JTC) nicht zu beobachten. 
Experiment 3: In einer prospektiven longitudinalen Studie wurden Patienten mit unterschiedlich 
ausgeprägter Wahnsymptomatik zu zwei Zeitpunkten mit dem oben beschriebenen JTC-
Paradigma untersucht. Die Veränderung der Ausprägung der Wahnsymptomatik korrelierte mit 
der Veränderung der Neigung zu voreiligen Entscheidungen. 
Diskussion: Beschriebene Auffälligkeiten im schlussfolgernden Denken und deren Beziehung 
zueinander wurden in der vorliegenden Arbeit näher untersucht. Im Zusammenspiel mit den oben 
Thesen 
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beschriebenen Einzelmodellen wie Theory-of-Mind Defiziten und einem externalen 
Attributionsstil könnten die hier beleuchteten Phänomene die Wahrscheinlichkeit falscher 
Schlüsse (JTC) und die Akzeptanz nicht stimmiger Hypothesen über die Umwelt (LA) zum Teil 
erklären und zur Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung von Wahn beitragen.  
 
